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CONGRESSIONAL ALTERNATIVES IN THE WAKE OF CITY OF
BOERNE V. FLORES: THE (LIMITED) ROLE OF CONGRESS IN
PROTECTING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM FROM STATE AND LOCAL
INFRINGEMENT
Daniel 0. Conkle°
In its 1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smith,' the Supreme Court
adopted a restrictive interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause. Congress
responded by enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
(RFRA),2 which was designed to repudiate Smith and to adopt a more generous
standard of religious freedom. In its recent decision in City of Boerne v.
Flores,3 however, the Supreme Court invalidated RERA, at least in its
application to state and local governmental practices, ruling that the Act
exceeded Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.4
As far as state and local governments are concerned, then, the federal law of
religious free exercise has reverted to the restrictive standard of Smith.5
What next? The most pressing issue is whether or how Congress should
respond to the Boerne decision. In theory, of course, Congress could propose
a constitutional amendment to nullify Smith or Boerne. As a matter of political
reality, however, there is no reason to believe that Congress is prepared to
move in that direction.6 More realistic questions relate to the possibility of
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University of Arkansas at Little Rock's Ben J. Altheimer Symposium, entitled "Requiem for
Religious Freedom?" Professor Ira C. Lupu offered helpful comments on my written draft, and
I also received other thoughtful comments and questions on the basis of my oral presentation.
In addition, I have profited from conversations with colleagues, including especially Patrick L.
Baude and Lauren Robel, and from discussions on the "religionlaw" and "conlaw" computer
list services. I am grateful to everyone who has contributed to this article. I also wish to thank
Dean Rodney K. Smith and the editors and staff of the University of Arkansas at Little Rock
Law Journal for sponsoring a wonderful symposium.
1. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994).
3. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
5. Boerne does not address the validity of RFRA insofar as it applies to federal laws and
practices. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2(l) & (2), 2000bb-3(a) & (b) (1994). As a
result, the immediate effect of Boerne, and my focus here, is on state and local laws and
practices that are valid under Smith but that would have faced more serious scrutiny under
RFRA. On the issue of RFRA's continuing validity at the federal level, see, for example,
Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), No. 93-2267, 1998 WL 16642
(8th Cir. Apr. 13, 1998) (holding, 2-1, that RFRA is constitutionally valid as applied to federal
laws and practices).
6. See Linda Greenhouse, Laws Urged to Restore Religion Act, N.Y. TIMES, July 15,
1997, at A ll; Robert D. McFadden, High Court Is Criticized for Striking Down Federal Law
Shielding Religious Practices, N.Y. TIMEs, June 27, 1997, at A 18.
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statutory responses. Should Congress enact new legislation that attempts to
protect religious freedom from state and local infringement? If so, what form
should this legislation take, and what source or sources of congressional power
would be adequate to support it? Or should Congress stay its hand, accepting
the Court's constitutional judgment and permitting the states to develop their
own approaches to religious freedom?
In Part I of this article, I will discuss Boerne's approach to Section 5 and
how it led to the invalidation of RFRA. As I will explain, the Court's decision
in Boerne was not surprising;7 although the Court elaborated and clarified the
scope of Section 5, its decision was well-grounded in constitutional precedent
and policy.8 In Part II, I will discuss a variety of ways in which Congress
7. Critics have contended, I believe mistakenly, that Boerne's interpretation and
application of Section 5 were not only surprising, but also radical. See, e.g., Protecting
Religious Freedom After Boerne v. Flores: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the
Constitution of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 105th Cong., 1 st
Sess. (July 14, 1997) <http://www.house.gov/judiciary/2.htm> [hereinafter House Committee
Hearing on Post-Boerne Legislation] (testimony of Charles W. Colson) (describing Boerne's
interpretation of Section 5 as "novel and dangerous"); id. (testimony of Douglas Laycock)
(stating that he thinks "Boerne has dramatically changed the law"); id. (testimony of Marc D.
Stem) (contending that Boerne's interpretation of Section 5 was a "distortion of federalism" and
that it "massively shifts power from Congress to the courts"); cf id. (testimony of Rev. Oliver
Thomas) (comparing the Supreme Court's decision in Boerne to its infamous decision in Dred
Scottv. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)).
8. In a 1995 article foreshadowing the Court's decision in Boerne, I argued that RFRA
exceeded the power of Congress under Section 5 and therefore was invalid in its application to
state and local governmental action. See Daniel 0, Conkle, The Religious Freedom Restoration
Act: The Constitutional Significance of an Unconstitutional Statute, 56 MONT. L. REV. 39
(1995). In portions of the current article, I rely and draw upon this earlier piece.
By the time the Court decided Boerne, scholars had published a broad range of articles
addressing the constitutionality of RFRA and offering a variety of perspectives and conclusions.
In addition to my article, see, for example, Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought?
An Interpretive Guide to the'Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 39 VILL. L. REv. I (1994);
Joanne C. Brant, Taking the Supreme Court at Its Word: The Implications for RFRA and
Separation of Powers, 56 MONT. L. REV. 5 (1995); Jay S. Bybee, Taking Liberties With the
First Amendment: Congress, Section 5, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 48 VAND.
L. REv. 1539 (1995); Robert A. Destro, "By What Right? ": The Sources and Limits of Federal
Court and Congressional Jurisdiction Over Matters "Touching Religion ", 29 IND. L. RaV. I
(1995); Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act Is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 437 (1994); Eugene Gressman &
Angela C. Carmella, The RFRA Revision of the Free Exercise Clause, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 65
(1996); Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Letting the Fox into the
Henhouse Under Cover of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 CARDoZO L. REV. 357
(1994); Scott C. Idleman, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Pushing the Limits of
Legislative Power, 73 TEX. L. REv. 247 (1994); Douglas Laycock, RFRA, Congress, and the
Ratchet, 56 MONT. L. REv. 145 (1995); Ira C. Lupu, Of Time and the RFRA: A Lawyer's Guide
to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 56 MONT. L. REv. 171 (1995); William P. Marshall,
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Establishment, Equal Protection and Free Speech
Concerns, 56 MONT. L. REv. 227 (1995); Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It:
Religious Freedom and the U.S. Code, 56 MONT. L. REv. 249 (1995); Bonnie I. Robin-Vergeer,
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might now respond to the Boerne decision. In particular, I will address the
following statutory possibilities: more narrowly tailored legislation under
Section 5; RFRA-like legislation grounded on Congress's power over interstate
commerce or its power to implement treaties; and spending power legislation
imposing RFRA-like conditions on the receipt of federal funding by state and
local governments. I will argue that Congress's power over interstate
commerce probably would not support RFRA-like legislation and that its
power to implement treaties, although more plausible, might also be inadequate
to the task. More limited congressional responses, grounded on Section 5 or
on the spending power, would rest on considerably stronger constitutional
footing, although-due to constitutional and practical limitations--they could
not accomplish the full objective of RFRA.
In conclusion, I will contend that Congress has a limited but important
role to play in protecting religious freedom from state and local infringement.
Congress should not repeat the mistake it made in adopting RFRA; in
particular, it should not repeat its attempt to repudiate altogether the Supreme
Court's basic approach to religious freedom and constitutional federalism.
Instead, Congress should proceed with caution, continuing its constitutional
conversation with the Court by enacting more limited legislation-grounded
perhaps on Section 5 or on Congress's power to implement treaties, but more
likely on the spending power. Any congressional legislation, moreover, should
be cautiously and carefully framed, steering clear of the confrontational
approach that proved fatal to RFRA. This sort of congressional restraint would
show a proper respect not only for the states, but also for the Constitution and
for the Supreme Court's role in constitutional interpretation. At the same time,
carefully drawn congressional legislation could prod the states, and perhaps the
Supreme Court as well, to adopt a more generous understanding of religious
freedom.
Disposing of the Red Herrings: A Defense of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 69 S.
CAL. L. REv. 589 (1996); William W. Van Alstyne, The Failure of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 DUKE L.J. 291 (1996). For
a colorful-albeit wildly erroneous--prediction of RFRA's fate in Boerne, see Michael Stokes
Paulsen, Counting Heads on RFRA, 14 CONST. Comm. 7 (1997); compare Suzanna Sherry,
RFRA-Vote Gambling: Why Paulsen Is Wrong, as Usual, 14 CONST. COMM. 27 (1997). For
a helpful symposium addressing an assortment of RFRA issues, see The James R. Browning
Symposium for 1994: The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 56 MONT. L. REv. 1 (1995).
1998]
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I. BOERNE 'S INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 5
A. The Path to Boerne
Before its decision in Employment Division v. Smith,9 the Supreme Court
had interpreted the Free Exercise Clause to provide significant protection for
religiously motivated conduct, even from laws of general application. Under
Sherbert v. Verner'° and Wisconsin v. Yoder,'1 general laws that had the effect
of burdening religious practices were tested by a standard of strict judicial
scrutiny. Thus, the Court stated in Sherbert that only a "compelling state
interest" could justify a burden on religious practices.12 To the same effect, the
Court in Yoder wrote that "only those interests of the highest order and those
not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of
religion."' 3 Under Sherbert and Yoder, if the government could not satisfy
strict scrutiny in justifying the application of a law to religiously motivated
conduct, an exemption from the law was constitutionally required. 4
Smith marked a dramatic turn in judicial doctrine. Although the Court
purported to distinguish and preserve its particular rulings in Sherbert and
9. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
10. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
11. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
12. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
13. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
14. Although the Court's test was strict in formulation, its application suggested a
somewhat more lenient standard of review. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-
60 (1982); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603-04 (1983). In addition, the
Court adopted explicit exceptions to strict scrutiny for military and prison regulations, which
it evaluated under a reasonableness or rational basis standard. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475
U.S. 503, 507-08 (1986) (military); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348-50 (1987)
(prisons). The Court also ruled that the Free Exercise Clause did not limit the government's
internal operations, even if those operations had an adverse effect on religious practices. See
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699-701 (1986) (holding that government's use of Social
Security numbers in administering federal food stamp programs does not implicate Free
Exercise Clause even though parent of Native American child believed such use would impair
child's spirit); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 447-53
(1988) (holding that Free Exercise Clause does not limit government's control over timber
harvesting and road construction through portions of national forest traditionally used by Native
American tribes for religious purposes). Outside these exceptional areas, however, the Court
continued to endorse a relatively demanding standard of review until its decision in Smith.
[Vol. 20
CONGRESSIONAL ALTERNATIVES
closely similar cases,' 5 as well as in Yoder,"6 the Court essentially renounced
the basic free exercise framework that it had been following, holding that
general laws affecting religious practices do not require any form of heightened
judicial review. 7 The Court wrote as follows: "To make an individual's
obligation to obey [a generally applicable] law contingent upon the law's
coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the State's interest is
'compelling'-permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, 'to become a law unto
himself--contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense."'' 8 As
a result of Smith, the Free Exercise Clause was essentially reduced to a
prohibition on purposeful governmental discrimination against religion, that is,
on governmental action tainted by "the unconstitutional object of targeting
religious beliefs and practices."' 9
The Court suggested that despite its ruling, legislatures remained free to
adopt religion-based exemptions, and that they might very well choose to do
so. On the particular issue in Smith, for example, the Court noted that "a
number of States have made an exception to their drug laws for sacramental
peyote use. "But to say that a nondiscriminatory religious-practice
exemption is permitted, or even that it is desirable," the Court continued, "is
not to say that it is constitutionally required, and that the appropriate occasions
for its creation can be discerned by the courts.'
In its discussion of religion-based exemptions, the Smith Court obviously
contemplated specific legislative accommodations, adopted on a state-by-state
basis in the context of particular laws. In the enactment of RFRA, however,
Congress concluded that this approach was inadequate and, indeed, that
Smith's interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause was erroneous. 22 Congress
further determined that it had the power, under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
15. Prior to Smith, the Court had reaffirmed and relied upon Sherbert in several factually
similar contexts. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Hobbie v. Unemployment
Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S.
829 (1989). The Court in Smith attempted to narrowly limit these decisions, stating that "[w]e
have never invalidated any governmental action on the basis of the Sherbert test except the
denial of unemployment compensation." Smith, 494 U.S. at 883.
16. The Court in Smith explained Yoder as a case involving a hybrid constitutional claim,
based not only on the Free Exercise Clause, but also on the constitutional right of parents to
control the education of their children. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
17. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 876-90. In so holding, the Court essentially reverted to the
doctrine embraced in its 1878 decision in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
18. Id. at 885 (citing Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167).
19. City ofBoerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2168 (1997).
20. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
21. Id.
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a) (1994) (statement of congressional findings).
1998]
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Amendment, to reverse the Smith interpretation and to impose its own
interpretation on the states.23
In RFRA's formal statement of findings and purposes, Congress referred
to the First Amendment's protection of religious free exercise;24 declared that
"governments should not substantially burden religious exercise without
compelling justification;"2 and noted that "in Employment Division v. Smith,
the Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the government
justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward
religion., 26 Asserting that "the compelling interest test as set forth in prior
Federal court rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances between
religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests,' 27 Congress
declared that the purpose of the Act was "to restore the compelling interest test
as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder and to guarantee its
application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially
burdened., 28  To effectuate this purpose, RFRA's primary substantive
provision stated that "Government shall not substantially burden a person's
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability,"29 unless the government can "demonstrate[] that application of
the burden to the person-(l) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest, 30
B. Boerne's General Approach to Section 5
Over the course of American history, the Supreme Court has become the
primary interpreter of the Constitution, and the task of constitutional
interpretation has become the Court's central and most important function.31
23. Although the Act, on its face, did not cite § 5 or any other source of congressional
power, both the House and Senate Reports explicitly relied on § 5. See H.R. REP. No. 88, 103d
Cong., I st Sess., at 9 (1993) [hereinafter HouSE REPORT ON RFRA]; S. REP. No. 111, 103d
Cong., I st Sess., at 13-14 (1993) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT ON RFRA]. The reports also
mentioned the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18, but
at least in terms of RFRA's application to state and local practices, this clause added little if
anything to § 5.
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(1) (1994).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(3).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4) (citation omitted).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(l) (citations omitted).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b). •
31. As Professors John E. Nowak and Ronald D. Rotunda have noted, "a major part of the
Court's history has been its continuing effort to establish, maintain, and strengthen" its role in
constitutional interpretation. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL
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Most of the Court's constitutional cases, moreover, involve challenges to state
and local governmental practices that are alleged to violate the Fourteenth
Amendment, either of its own force or through its incorporation of Bill of
Rights standards.32 In deciding these challenges to state and local practices, the
Court defines the meaning of constitutionally protected individual freedom.
At the same time, however, it also defines the constitutional boundary between
national and state power, for to decide that the national Constitution protects
an individual right is to remove the issue from state and local control.33
Although the Supreme Court is the primary interpreter of the Fourteenth
Amendment and of its Bill of Rights component, Congress has a significant
role as well. In particular, Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, like the
final sections of the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, grants Congress the
"power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article. 34
In a series of cases predating Boerne, the Supreme Court had carefully explored
the nature and limits of Congress's enforcement power. As I have explained
elsewhere, these precedents authorized Congress to act under Section 5 to
supplement or complement the Supreme Court's protection of constitutional
rights, but not to undermine the Court's substantive constitutional standards or
its basic interpretive function.35
In Boerne, the Court followed the thrust of its prior doctrine, but it also
elaborated and clarified the scope of Section 5 .36 Thus, the Court reaffirmed
LAW 1 (5th ed. 1995).
32. For an elaboration of the process by which the Court has incorporated almost all of
the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment, see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-
50(1968).
33. As the Court wrote in Boerne, a proper interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment
must honor not only the continuing importance of constitutional federalism, but also "the
traditional separation of powers between Congress and the Judiciary" in the definition and
protection of constitutional rights. See Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2166. The Court explained:
The first eight Amendments to the Constitution set forth self-executing prohibitions
on governmental action, and this Court has had primary authority to interpret those
prohibitions .... As enacted, the Fourteenth Amendment confers substantive rights
against the States which, like the provisions of the Bill of Rights, are self-executing
.... The power to interpret the Constitution in a case or controversy remains in the
Judiciary.
Id.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; see also id. amend. XIII, § 2; amend. XV, § 2.
35. See Conkle, supra note 8, at 41-55.
36. Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court in Boerne. His basic approach to Section 5 and
his explanation of RFRA's unconstitutionality were joined by six justices. (Five joined Justice
Kennedy's opinion in its entirety; the sixth, Justice Scalia, joined all of the opinion except a
discussion concerning the history of the Fourteenth Amendment.) Justice Stevens filed a brief
concurring opinion, indicating that in his view, RFRA not only exceeded the power of Congress
under Section 5, but also was a "law respecting an establishment of religion" in violation of the
First Amendment's Establishment Clause. See Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2172 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I). In dissenting opinions, Justices O'Connor, Souter,
1998] 639
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that Congress can enact "remedial or preventive legislation" to enforce not only
the Fourteenth Amendment as such, but also the Fourteenth Amendment's
incorporation of Bill of Rights standards, such as those of the Free Exercise
Clause.37 At the same time, however, the Court rejected the argument that
Congress also has a non-remedial, "substantive" power under Section 5, that
is, a power to redefie the meaning of constitutional rights.3s In so doing, the
Court limited its earlier decision in Katzenbach v. Morgan,39 which arguably
had implied that a substantive power did or might exist.4
Boerne thus makes clear that Congress is limited to the "enforcement" of
the Supreme Court's substantive understanding of the Constitution; Congress
is not permitted to modify the substantive content of constitutional rights."'
Congress "has been given the power 'to enforce,"' the Court reasoned, "not the
power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation."A2 This limiting
effect of Boerne, however, should not be exaggerated. A theory of substantive
power was, at best, an alternative ground of decision in Morgan; the Court had
not relied on the substantive theory in its other Section 5 cases; and there had
been judicial statements expressing doubts concerning the validity of such a
theory.43
The essence of Section 5 power has always been remedial, and Boerne
continues to recognize that Congress has "wide latitude" in the exercise of this
power." Not only can Congress create criminal or civil remedies for individual
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, including the Fourteenth
Amendment's incorporation of Bill of Rights standards, it also can modify or
abbreviate the case-by-case process of adjudicating constitutional claims. 5
and Breyer did not dispute the Court's general approach to Section 5; indeed, Justice O'Connor
explicitly approved it. See Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2176 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also id.
at 2185-86 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 2186 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Rather, the three
dissenters suggested that the Court should defer the question of RFRA's constitutional validity
until the Court itself had reconsidered the Smith interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause. In
response to historical arguments contained in Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion, Justice
Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, filed a concurring opinion defending the approach of Smith.
See Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2172-76 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
37. See id. at 2163-64 (majority opinion).
38. See id. at 2162-68.
39. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
40. See Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2167-68; see also Conkle, supra note 8, at 46-53.
41. See Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2162-68.
42. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2164. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied not only on
the text of Section 5, but also on the history of its enactment as well as early and more recent
judicial interpretations of its meaning. See id. at 2162-68. For a critique of the Court's
historical argument, see Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of
City of Boerne v. Flores, 11 HARV. L. REv. 153, 174-83 (1997).
43. See Conkle, supra note 8, at 46-53.
44. See Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2164.
45. See Conkle, supra note 8, at 42.
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Thus, Congress can adopt statutory provisions that are designed either to ensure
that prior violations of the Amendment are fully remedied or to guard against
the risk of future violations."6 As the Court wrote in Boerne, "[L]egislation
which deters or remedies constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of
Congress' enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which
is not itself unconstitutional ....
Although Congress's remedial power is broad, it is not without limit.
Previous cases had suggested that Congress's remedial judgments must be
"rational," '48 and Boerne confirms this approach. Thus, although Congress
retains "wide latitude,"49 its lawmaking must reasonably be understood as an
attempt to vindicate constitutional rights as the Supreme Court has defined
them. In order to satisfy this condition, according to Boerne, "There must be
a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or
remedied [that is, violations of the Constitution, as understood by the Supreme
Court] and the means adopted to that end."50
Boerne's requirement of "congruence" demands that the congressional
statute, viewed as an attempt to prevent or remedy constitutional violations, not
be unduly overinclusive." Congress certainly need not limit itself to individual
violations of the Constitution. Boerne explicitly reaffirms that Congress is free
to write more general laws, explaining that "[p]reventive measures prohibiting
certain types of laws may be appropriate when there is reason to believe that
many of the laws affected by the congressional enactment have a significant
likelihood of being unconstitutional. 5 2 But if Congress adopts a law that
indiscriminately sweeps in a broad array of otherwise lawful state and local
practices, the very breadth of the law suggests that it cannot be understood as
remedial.53
46. See Conkle, supra note 8, at 42-45.
47. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2163. The Court cited with approval a series of prior decisions
granting Congress broad leeway in its exercise of remedial power, including South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); and City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980). See
Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2163; see also Conkle, supra note 8, at 42-45.
48. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 324 ("Congress may use any
rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting.");
City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 177 ("Congress could rationally have concluded that, because
electoral changes by jurisdictions with a demonstrable history of intentional racial
discrimination in voting create the risk of purposeful discrimination, it was proper to prohibit
changes that have a discriminatory impact.").
49. See Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2164.
50. Id.





A remedy is "proportional" if it is justified by the magnitude of the
constitutional injury. "Strong measures appropriate to address one harm," the
Court wrote in Boerne, "may be an unwarranted response to another, lesser
one. ' 54 Properly understood, however, the requirement of proportionality is not
an independent variable; instead, it is closely related to the requirement of
congruence." In particular, the nature and extent of the constitutional problem
being redressed affect the degree of overinclusiveness that is permissible. An
extremely broad congressional prohibition may be rational if there is evidence
of serious and widespread constitutional violations by state and local
governments, especially if those violations would be difficult to prove through
case-by-case litigation. For example, as the Court explained in Boerne, "strong
remedial and preventive measures" have been upheld when they have been
designed to redress "the widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional
rights resulting from this country's history of racial discrimination."
56
Conversely, if the constitutional problem is less severe, Congress must proceed
more cautiously. Indeed, the less serious the constitutional problem, the more
likely it is that broad legislation is designed not to remedy that problem, but
instead to accomplish another end, such as the substantive redefinition of
constitutional rights.
C. Boerne's Section 5 Analysis as Applied to RFRA
Even as refined by the requirements of congruence and proportionality,
the rationality standard for remedial legislation is hardly a bright-line test.57
Applications require the exercise of judgment, and close questions may arise
concerning the validity of particular exercises of congressional power.
However imprecise the rationality standard, however, not all applications are
difficult, and Boerne's invalidation of RFRA can fairly be described as an easy
case.
58
54. Id. at 2169.
55. Indeed, the Court in Boerne did not clearly distinguish the two requirements. My
discussion in the text is designed to explain how these two requirements can and should be
understood. I believe that my explanation is consistent with the basic reasoning of Boerne, if
not with all of the Court's specific language.
56. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2167.
57. As the Court conceded in Boerne, "the line between measures that remedy or prevent
unconstitutional actions and measures that make a substantive change in the governing law is
not easy to discern." Id. at 2164.
58. It therefore is not surprising that no justice dissented from the Court's reasoning or
result on this question, that is, assuming the continued validity of Smith. See supra note 36.
Assuming the continued validity of Smith, the interesting question in Boerne was not
whether RFRA could be defended on a remedial theory; it plainly could not. See Conkle, supra
note 8, at 42-45, 61-62. The interesting question was whether the Act could be defended
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Under the remedial theory of congressional power, the definition of
constitutional violations depends on the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
relevant constitutional right. In Smith,59 the Court held that general laws
affecting religious practices ordinarily do not violate the Free Exercise
Clause.' Instead, the Court suggested, religious practices are constitutionally
protected only from laws that target religion for special disadvantage6 1-- that
is, from laws that discriminate against religion.62 Although the Court's
understanding of "discrimination" in this context is not entirely clear, it appears
to contemplate deliberate or purposeful discrimination against religion.
Accordingly, the Court wrote in Boerne that RFRA could survive as a remedial
measure only if it were designed to redress state and local laws "enacted with
the unconstitutional object of targeting religious beliefs and practices., 63 Only
then, the Court explained, could RFRA be regarded as "a reasonable means of
protecting the free exercise of religion as defined by Smith."'
In the enactment of RFRA, however, Congress forthrightly rejected the
Smith interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause. Thus, in RFRA's formal
statement of findings, Congress directly contested the Supreme Court's belief
that general laws do not implicate the Free Exercise Clause, stating that "laws
'neutral' toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws
intended to interfere with religious exercise. '  Proceeding on the mistaken
assumption that it had a substantive power to redefine the meaning of the
Constitution, Congress formulated broadly-framed legislation reaching all laws
that operate to substantially burden religious practices, however general those
nonetheless, on a substantive theory permitting Congress to redefine the meaning of the Free
Exercise Clause. Addressing this question prior to Boerne, I contended that Congress should
be accorded a limited substantive power under Section 5, but that RFRA went beyond the limits
that such a power necessarily would require. See Conkle, supra note 8, at 46-55, 66-79. In
Boerne, of course, the Court categorically rejected the substantive theory of congressional
power, leaving only the remedial theory and thereby ensuring RFRA's invalidation. See supra
notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
59. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
60. See id. at 876-90.
61. In its attempt to explain prior precedents, the Court suggested that certain situations,
including unemployment cases and hybrid constitutional claims, were outside the scope of this
general principle. See id. at 881-84; see also supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
62. Laws that in fact discriminate against religion are subject to extremely rigorous
constitutional scrutiny, a level of scrutiny that all but ensures invalidation. See Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993) ("A law burdening
religious practice that is not neutral or not of general application must undergo the most
rigorous of scrutiny."); id. ("A law that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment or
advances legitimate governmental interests only against conduct with a religious motivation
will survive strict scrutiny only in rare cases.").
63. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2168.
64. Id.
65. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(2) (1994).
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laws might be. Such legislation could not plausibly be understood as an
attempt merely to remedy past or future violations of free exercise rights, as
defined in Smith.
To be sure, a state might target religion in violation of the Smith standard
through a general law that disguised the legislature's underlying purpose, or a
prosecutor might use a general law to persecute religious believers on a
selective basis. In such a situation, RFRA would eliminate the challenger's
difficulties of proof in a manner analogous to other congressional legislation
that the Court has approved on a remedial theory.66 But only a small fraction
of RFRA's applications could be justified on this basis. In the vast majority of
situations, general laws are enacted with no thought of their possible
application to religious practices, and prosecutors are engaged in good faith
efforts to enforce the general policies that these laws are designed to promote.
Although the remedial theory permits Congress to formulate administratively
convenient remedies, an argument of administrative convenience-even under
a standard of rationality-simply could not explain RFRA's broad application
to general laws of all sorts. In terms of Boerne's requirement of congruence,
RFRA's "[s]weeping coverage" made it radically overinclusive.67
In terms of proportionality, moreover, the Act's overinclusiveness could
in no way be explained or justified by the magnitude of the constitutional
problem being addressed. As the Court noted in Boerne, there was no
persuasive evidence that state and local discrimination against religion-overt
or covert-was a significant or serious problem.6 To the contrary, "the
emphasis of the [congressional hearings on RFRA] was on laws of general
applicability which place incidental burdens on religion," as opposed to
"legislation enacted or enforced due to animus or hostility to the burdened
religious practices." Lacking anything likea "widespread pattern of religious
discrimination in this country, 7° the Act's intrusion on the power and
prerogatives of state and local governments was grossly disproportionate to
whatever constitutional benefit it would produce. As the Court explained, "The
substantial costs RFRA exacts, both in practical terms of imposing a heavy
66. For an argument along these lines, see Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991:
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the
Judiciary, House of Representatives, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 357-58 (1992) [hereinafter House
Committee Hearings on RFRA] (testimony of Douglas Laycock); The Religious Freedom
Restoration Act: Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. 95-96 (1992) [hereinafter Senate Committee Hearing on RFRA] (testimony of
Douglas Laycock); Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 BYU L.
REv. 221, 251-52; see also Berg, supra note 8, at 67-68.
67. See Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at2170.
68. See id. at 2169-70.
69. Id. at 2169.
70. Id.
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litigation bu ' den on the States and in terms of curtailing their traditional
general regulatory power, far exceed any pattern or practice of unconstitutional
conduct under the Free Exercise Clause as interpreted in Smith."'"
Especially in the absence of relevant congressional findings or other
persuasive evidence that Congress actually relied on a remedial theory,72 RFRA
simply could not be justified on that basis. As the Court concluded in Boerne,
the Act could only be explained as an impermissible attempt to redefine the
substance of the Free Exercise Clause:
RFRA cannot be considered remedial, preventive legislation, if those terms
are to have any meaning. RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed
remedial or preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to,
or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior. It appears, instead, to
attempt a substantive change in constitutional protections."
According to the Court, such a congressional effort was fatally flawed because
it compromised "vital principles necessary to maintain separation of powers
and the federal balance." 74
71. Id. at 2171. The Court rejected the possibility of interpreting RFRA, despite its
language, to mandate something less than strict judicial scrutiny, noting that even "intermediate
scrutiny" of state laws and practices, "with the attendant likelihood of invalidation," would be
an unconstitutional "congressional intrusion into the States' traditional prerogatives and general
authority to regulate for the health and welfare of their citizens." Id. For a pre-Boerne
suggestion that RFRA might be construed narrowly to help protect its constitutional validity,
see Lupu, supra note 8, at 212-25.
72. Professor Laycock urged Congress to make specific findings that might have made a
remedial theory more plausible. See House Committee Hearings on RFRA, supra note 66, at
357-58, 398 (urging Congress to find, inter alia, that facially neutral laws have been used as
instruments of active religious persecution and that judicial review of legislative motive is
insufficient to protect against this possibility); Senate Committee Hearing on RFRA, supra note
66, at 95-96, 129 (making the same recommendation). But Congress's formal statement of
legislative findings made no mention of any such problems. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a) (1994)
(statement of congressional findings).
In arguing that the Smith approach offered too little protection to religious exercise, the
House Report did comment that "legislative motive often cannot be determined and courts have
been reluctant to impute bad motives to legislators." HOUSE REPORT ON RFRA, supra note 23,
at 6. But this language was omitted from the Senate Report, and neither report made any effort
to elaborate a remedial theory. See generally HOUSE REPORT ON RFRA, supra note 23; SENATE
REPORT ON RFRA, supra note 23.
73. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2170.
74. Id. at 2172.
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II. POTENTIAL CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSES TO BOERNE
Boerne reinstates Employment Division v. Smith75 as the governing federal
standard for state and local practices that burden religiously motivated conduct.
As demonstrated by its enactment of RFRA, Congress prefers a more generous
standard of religious freedom. In the wake of Boerne, therefore, Congress is
certain to consider lawmaking that would once again expand religious freedom
beyond the restrictive approach of Smith. Indeed, congressional hearings have
already begun.76
New legislation might take a number of forms, and it might be grounded
on any of several sources of congressional power. Thus, Congress might adopt
more narrowly tailored legislation under Section 5, RFRA-like legislation
grounded on Congress's power over interstate commerce or its power to
implement treaties, or spending power legislation imposing RFRA-like
conditions on the receipt of federal funding by state and local governments. I
will discuss each of these alternatives in turn, focusing primarily on the scope
75. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
76. On July 14, 1997, less than three weeks after the Court's decision in Boerne, the
Constitution Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee held a hearing on "Protecting
Religious Freedom After Boerne v. Flores." See House Committee Hearing on Post-Boerne
Legislation, supra note 7; see also Greenhouse, supra note 6; Religious Freedom Issue
Examined Before House Judiciary Subcommittee, 66 U.S.L.W. 2059 (1997). The Senate
Judiciary Committee followed suit on October 1, 1997, holding a hearing on "Congress'
Constitutional Role in Protecting Religious Liberty." See Congress' Constitutional Role in
Protecting Religious Liberty: Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States
Senate, 105th Cong., 1 st Sess. (1997) [hereinafter Senate Committee Hearing on Post-Boerne
Legislation].
I was one of the witnesses at the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, where I presented
testimony tracking the arguments that I advance in this article. Two other contributors to this
symposium, Professors Thomas C. Berg and Douglas Laycock, also presented congressional
testimony-Professor Berg on the House side, and Professor Laycock at the House and Senate
hearings alike. (In his Senate testimony, Professor Laycock substantially repeated most of his
House testimony, but he also included additional observations; in this article, I cite to Professor
Laycock's House testimony except for points made only at the Senate hearing.) In their
contributions to this symposium, Professors Berg and Laycock elaborate and explain some of
the arguments that they offered in their congressional testimony. See Thomas C. Berg, The
Constitutional Future of Religious Freedom Legislation, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 715, pt.
I (1998); Professor Douglas Laycock, Address at the Univeristy of Arkansas at Little Rock,
Symposium (Sept. 19 & 20, 1997).
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of Congress's constitutional power,7 but also touching on related questions
concerning the desirability or effectiveness of each alternative.
A. More Narrowly Tailored Legislation Under Section 5
Perhaps the most obvious response to Boerne would be congressional
legislation grounded once again on Section 5, but designed to meet the
Supreme Court's objections to RFRA. In proceeding under Section 5,
Congress would have to accept Smith's interpretation of the Free Exercise
Clause. If Congress were willing to accept that interpretation, however, it
would have "wide latitude" in the enactment of remedial legislation.71 Thus,
as long as its remedial judgments were "rational,"7 9 it could act to redress state
and local laws and practices that are animated by "the unconstitutional object
of targeting religious beliefs and practices."8 °
To meet the test of rationality, any congressional enactment would have
to satisfy Boerne's requirements of congruence and proportionality. Accepting
Smith's interpretation of the First Amendment, the problem of free exercise
violations in the contemporary United States cannot be described as extreme
or extensive; there simply is no broad or general pattern of governmental
discrimination against religion."' As a result, a "proportional" response to this
77. My focus is on issues of constitutional federalism, and I therefore am largely ignoring
the question of whether new congressional legislation could be successfully challenged on the
ground that it prefers or favors religion in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. Suffice it to say that I doubt that the Establishment
Clause would present an obstacle to legislation of the sort that I discuss in this article. But cf
Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2172 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing, but only for himself, that RFRA
not only exceeded the power of Congress under Section 5, but also was a "'law respecting an
establishment of religion' in violation of the Establishment Clause). For further discussion of
potential Establishment Clause issues, see Conkle, supra note 8, at 77 n. 187; Idleman, supra
note 8, at 286-306; Marshall, supra note 8, at 237-42. For an argument that RFRA-like
legislation should be found to violate the Establishment Clause simply for "seeking to dictate
church-state relations," see Jed Rubenfeld, Antidisestablishmentarianism: Why RFRA Really
Was Unconstitutional, 95 MICH. L. REv. 2347, 2350 (1997).
I also am putting aside the contention that new legislation, even if otherwise within the
scope of congressional power, might violate separation of powers as an unconstitutional
"congressional intrusion into the exclusive judicial case-or-controversy arena." See Eugene
Gressman, The Necessary and Proper Downfall ofRFRA, NEXUS, Fall 1997, at 73, 81. Again,
suffice it to say that I doubt that this argument, in itself, would justify an invalidation of the sort
of legislation that I discuss.
78. SeeBoerne, 117S. Ct. at2164.
79. See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.
80. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2168 (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993)).
81. One could argue that governmental officials in the contemporary United States, in
general, are inclined to appreciate and support the exercise of religious freedom. Witness, for
example, the overwhelming congressional support for RFRA itself. See Conkle, supra note 8,
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problem would have to be tailored in a reasonably narrow fashion. 2 In other
words, the magnitude of the constitutional problem could not be said to justify
any special or unusual congressional leeway with respect to the requirement of
congruence.
Although Congress would not be given special or unusual leeway in
redressing free exercise violations, it would have considerable power and
discretion nonetheless. More specifically, Congress probably would have the
power to adopt at least three sorts of remedial legislation--assuming that it
could support the legislation with appropriate congressional findings.
First, Congress could enact purely procedural legislation. In particular,
Congress could enact legislation that would be designed to alleviate difficulties
in proving discrimination against religion, as contemplated by Smith. For
example, Congress might provide that once a religious believer has proved that
a law or governmental practice has a substantially discriminatory effect on
religion,83 that proof, in itself, would permit the fact-finder to infer the
existence of discriminatory purpose. Such legislation thus would authorize a
permissive inference of discriminatory purpose upon a claimant's showing of
substantially discriminatory effect; this showing would permit a finding of
discriminatory purpose-although it would not require such a finding, even if
the government presented no competing evidence.' Another form of
at 88-89. In any event, there is little evidence that governmental officials are inclined to
discriminate against religion in a manner that would violate the standard of Smith. Cf. House
Committee Hearing on Post-Boerne Legislation, supra note 7 (testimony of Mark E. Chopko)
("We do not believe that anti-religious discrimination is rampant . . . . Intentional
discrimination is not the rule and discrimination is not tolerated in this society."); but cf. Senate
Committee Hearing on Post-Boerne Legislation, supra note 76 (testimony of Douglas Laycock)
(arguing that large numbers of Americans are hostile to religious fundamentalists and to
members of minority cults and sects; that this hostility infects the discretionary decisionmaking
of governmental administrators, juries, and perhaps even judges; and that "if all the facts were
known in every case, widespread violations" of the Smith standard would thereby be revealed).
82. But see Senate Committee Hearing on Post-Boerne Legislation, supra note 76
(testimony of Erwin Chemerinsky) (suggesting that, if it compiled an appropriate record and
engaged in detailed fact-finding, Congress could "reenact the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act"--presumably without any modification of its substantive provisions-as an exercise of
its remedial power under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment").
83. A law or governmental practice might have a substantially discriminatory effect on
religion either because its primary application--assuming full implementation and
enforcement--is to religious conduct, or because its actual implementation or enforcement
reveals that, in operation, the law or practice in fact is applied primarily to religious conduct.
84. Congress might go further, creating a genuine (rebuttable) presumption of
discriminatory purpose upon a showing of substantially discriminatory effect. Thus, Congress
might provide that such a showing would require the fact-finder to find discriminatory purpose
unless the government presented evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption. This approach
probably would be within the remedial power of Congress, but it might be challenged under
Boerne on the basis of congruence or proportionality. The approach described in the text, by
contrast, would be virtually unassailable under Boerne, and, as a practical matter, it probably
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procedural legislation would enhance the judicial remedies for purposeful
discrimination against religion, however proved. For example, the legislation
might authorize not only equitable relief and the recovery of actual damages,
but also the recovery of reasonable attorney fees. In addition, it might permit
the award of statutorily specified minimum damages 85 or even punitive
damages, which, according to the Supreme Court, "are especially appropriate
to redress the violation by a Government official of a citizen's constitutional
rights.
'8 6
Second, Congress probably could go further in the context of particular
fields of state and local regulation, based upon the risk of purposeful discrimi-
would have a very similar effect in the context of actual litigation. For a helpful explanation
of evidentiary presumptions and inferences, see GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE 55-65 (2d ed. 1987); see also id. at 80-82 (discussing relevant provisions of
the Federal Rules of Evidence and the interaction of these provisions with congressional statutes
creating particular presumptions).
Among other procedural suggestions, Professor Michael Stokes Paulsen has proposed
that the government be required to bear "the burden of proof.., to justify its actions as not
being discriminatory" in any case in which the claimant can demonstrate a "substantial burden"
on the exercise of religion. See Senate Committee Hearing on Post-Boerne Legislation, supra
note 76 (testimony of Michael Stokes Paulsen) (emphasis in original). Paulsen thus would have
Congress create a genuine (rebuttable) presumption of discriminatory purpose upon a claimant's
showing merely of a substantial burden on the exercise of religion, even in the absence of any
evidence affirmatively suggesting discrimination against religion, either in purpose or effect.
Paulsen goes further, arguing that this presumption should force the government to prove the
absence of discriminatory purpose by "clear and convincing" evidence. See id. Paulsen's
proposed presumption would severely test the boundaries of Section 5, and it probably would
be invalidated. Because it would extend to every case involving a "substantial burden" on the
exercise of religion, this presumption would apply in every case previously covered by RFRA
itself. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a) (1994). Unlike under RFRA, the government could avoid
strict scrutiny by proving the absence of discriminatory purpose. Like RFRA, however, a
presumption of this kind would adversely affect the government in a broad range of cases, the
vast majority of which would not involve an actual violation of the Constitution, as interpreted
by the Supreme Court. As a result, the Court probably would invalidate this sort of
presumption on the basis of Boerne's requirements of congruence and proportionality.
85. See Senate Committee Hearing on Post-Boerne Legislation, supra note 76 (testimony
of Michael Stokes Paulsen).
86. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 22 (1980); see also Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30
(1983).
When acting within the proper scope of its authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Congress is free to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the states, as
long as it clearly expresses its intent to do so. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452-56
(1976); see also Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1125 (1996); id. at 1131
n. 15 (noting that Congress's Fourteenth Amendment authority to abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity is "undisputed"); see generally U.S. CONST. amend. Xl. Thus, Congress
could authorize federal-court actions for these various types of relief without regard to any
Eleventh Amendment immunity that might otherwise be available. For an introduction to the
Eleventh Amendment and its many complexities, see I RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E.




nation against religion in those particular fields. Land use regulation, for
example, may be one area in which a serious risk or likelihood of purposeful
discrimination could be documented, making it possible for Congress to make
detailed and persuasive congressional findings.8 7 According to Boerne,
Congress has the power to address governmental practices that "have a
significant likelihood of being unconstitutional 88 under Smith, even if the
congressional legislation sweeps in "conduct which is not itself unconstitu-
tional. 8 9 Because Smith prohibits purposeful governmental discrimination
against religion, Congress could move against governmental practices that are
likely to reflect such discrimination, even if the discriminatory purpose could
not be proven in any given case. If Congress were to follow this course, it
might choose to make unlawful, or presumptively unlawful (for example,
subject to a "compelling interest" test), specified governmental practices in
particular areas such as land use regulation. Or Congress might declare
presumptively unlawful all governmental practices in these areas that can be
proven in litigation to have a substantially discriminatory effect on religion.
Third, Congress probably would have the power to go even further,
declaring that the difficulties of proving purposeful discrimination justify a
more broadly framed remedial response. Thus, Congress probably could enact
a general law--not limited to particular areas of state and local regulation--that
was designed to redress governmental practices that have a substantially
discriminatory effect on religion in situations suggesting a serious risk or
significant likelihood of discriminatory purpose. For example, the legislation
might authorize relief for religious claimants if they are able to (a) prove that
the challenged law or governmental practice has a substantially discriminatory
effect on religion and (b) present some degree of credible evidence suggesting
discriminatory purpose. This evidence of discriminatory purpose might be
based on historical patterns of governmental decisionmaking, for example, or
on the contemporary circumstances surrounding the adoption of the law or
governmental practice at issue.90 At least in this context, moreover, it might be
87. See House Committee Hearing on Post-Boerne Legislation, supra note 7 (testimony
of Douglas Laycock) (arguing that "[t]he clearest example [of such an area] is land use
regulation, which has enormous disparate impact on churches, which is administered through
highly discretionary and individualized processes that leave ample room for deliberate but
hidden discrimination, and where there is substantial evidence of widespread hostility to non-
mainstream churches and some hostility to all churches").
88. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2170.
89. Id. at 2163.
90. This evidence of discriminatory purpose would be enhanced if the claimants could
show that their religious group, or their religious practice, was generally unpopular in the state
or locality in question. Cf Senate Committee Hearing on Post-Boerne Legislation, supra note
76 (testimony of Douglas Laycock) (presenting evidence that religious fundamentalists and the
members of minority cults and sects are the subject of widespread hostility in the United States,
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enough for the claimant to present credible evidence of governmental "mixed
motives," some portion of which involved discrimination against religion.9'
In the context of voting rights, the Supreme Court has upheld remedial
legislation directed toward state and local practices having a discriminatory
effect on racial minorities in situations presenting a serious risk of purpose-
ful---and therefore unconstitutional-discrimination based on race.92 Although
Congress may have particularly broad discretion in dealing with racial
discrimination, 93 the Court would be likely to approve similar legislation in the
context of religious freedom, at least if Congress developed a suitable record
and made appropriate findings.94 Indeed, the Court in Boerne specifically
noted that RFRA was not a "discriminatory effects or disparate impact" statute,
implying that such a statute would present a very different situation.95
Although Congress probably would have the power to enact remedial
legislation in one or more of the three forms that I have described, the impact
of this legislation would be limited. At most, Congress could expand upon
Smith by moving against certain governmental action that has a discriminatory
and arguing that this hostility is likely to infect discretionary governmental decisionmaking).
91. Cf Senate Committee Hearing on Post-Boerne Legislation, supra note 76 (testimony
of Michael Stokes Paulsen) (arguing that Section 5 would permit Congress to authorize relief
in any case in which governmental action substantially burdening the exercise of religion were
shown to rest in part on the impermissible motivation of discrimination against religion).
92. See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 177 (1980) ("Congress could
rationally have concluded that, because electoral changes by jurisdictions with a demonstrable
history of intentional racial discrimination in voting create the risk of purposeful discrimination,
it was proper to prohibit changes that have a discriminatory impact.").
93. See Conkle, supra note 8, at 68-69.
94. To be sure, it might not be easy for Congress to develop a suitable record and make
appropriate findings. In particular, it might not be possible for Congress to make reasonable
claims about the risk of purposeful discrimination against religion, and therefore about the need
to redress that risk. On the other hand, such claims might well be reasonable, at least with
respect to certain fields or areas of governmental regulation. See supra note 87 and
accompanying text (discussing land use regulation); House Committee Hearing on Post-Boerne
Legislation, supra note 7 (testimony of Marc D. Stem) (arguing that "[t]he problems of
religious discrimination are apparent in many areas of discretionary governmental authority,"
including "zoning, schools, prisons, and others"). If Congress were only able to make
reasonable claims with respect to particular fields, of course, the scope of its remedial
legislation would have to be limited accordingly. Cf Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2170 (noting that
remedial legislation approved in the past had been "limited to those cases in which
constitutional violations were most likely (in order to reduce the possibility of overbreadth)").
95. See Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2171. The Court explained:
In most cases, the state laws to which RFRA applies are not ones which will have
been motivated by religious bigotry. If a state law disproportionately burdened a
particular class of religious observers, this circumstance might be evidence of an
impermissible legislative motive. Cf Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241
(1976). RFRA's substantial burden test, however, is not even a discriminatory
effects or disparate impact test.
Id. (parallel citations omitted).
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effect on religion.9 Although undoubtedly more common than demonstrable,
purposeful discrimination, even unintentional discrimination against religion
is not prevalent in state and local lawmaking. This problem, such as it is, was
not the problem that moved Congress to enact RFRA, which (however ill-
advised as a matter of congressional power) was designed as it was for a
reason. Congress was not concerned-and it had no great reason to be
concerned-about discrimination against religion, whether purposeful or
96. Testifying before Congress in the aftermath of Boerne, Professor Douglas Laycock
has argued that Smith itself, coupled with the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Church
of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), could be interpreted
to protect religious practices from certain laws that have a discriminatory effect on
religion-even in the absence of discriminatory purpose. See House Committee Hearing on
Post-Boerne Legislation, supra note 7 (testimony of Douglas Laycock). In particular, Laycock
contends that "[w]here a law has secular exceptions or an individualized exemption process, any
burden on religion requires compelling justification under reasonable interpretations of Smith."
Id.; see generally Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup. CT. REV. 1. If
Laycock is right about the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause, as interpreted by the Supreme
Court, then remedial legislation under Section 5 might permissibly go even further, extending
its reach to state and local laws and practices that are likely to reflect what Laycock contends
are the constitutionally forbidden discriminatory effects.
The difficulty with this argument is that it depends, as Professor Laycock acknowledges,
on a disputed interpretation of Smith and Lukumi. To be sure, Smith suggested that as compared
to general laws, situations involving "individualized governmental assessments" would be more
likely to trigger serious judicial scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause, and Lukumi makes
clear that a law having a dramatically discriminatory effect on religion is likely to be
invalidated under the Clause--if only because that sort of effect makes evident the law's
discriminatory purpose. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 884; Lukumi, 508 U.S. 520. In the absence of
unusual or special circumstances, however, the Supreme Court is unlikely to find that the Free
Exercise Clause, standing alone, has been violated in the absence of purposeful discrimination
against religion. This is all the more so after Boerne, in which the Court described the rule of
Smith and Lukumi as a prohibition on governmental action tainted by "the unconstitutional
object of targeting religious beliefs and practices." Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2168.
Despite my reading of the cases, however, a more expansive interpretation of Smith and
Lukumi-an interpretation along the lines suggested by Professor Laycock-certainly is
possible. But this possibility itself creates a potential problem in the crafting of remedial
legislation. In the absence of congressional legislation, litigants might advance their
interpretive arguments in the courts, potentially expanding the constitutional protection
available under the Free Exercise Clause. Conversely, congressional legislation, in order to
avoid the risk of invalidation, probably should accept a narrow understanding of Smith and
Lukumi--that is, one that finds unconstitutional discrimination only in the presence of
purposeful discrimination against religion. This congressional approach, however, could have
the effect of conceding a narrow understanding of the Free Exercise Clause, and it therefore
could tend to impede a favorable evolution of judicial doctrine on this point.
For an argument different from Laycock's, but raising somewhat similar issues, see
Senate Committee Hearing on Post-Boerne Legislation, supra note 76 (testimony of Michael
Stokes Paulsen) (suggesting that congressional legislation under Section 5 probably could
extend to governmental action that is the product of "'deliberate indifference' to or 'reckless
disregard' of" an adverse impact on religious conduct, on the ground that such action comes
close to purposeful discrimination).
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otherwise. The problem Congress wished to address in RFRA was nondiscrim-
inatory governmental action that has the incidental effect of burdening
religious conduct. That type of governmental action is immune from challenge
under Smith, it is immune from challenge after Boerne, and it would remain
immune from challenge under remedial legislation grounded on Section 5.
Remedial legislation under Section 5 could benefit religious freedom to a
degree, but it would not advance the basic objective of RFRA. 9
B. RFRA-Like Legislation Grounded on Congress's Power Over
Interstate Commerce or Its Power to Implement Treaties
To accomplish all that RFRA was designed to accomplish, of course,
Congress would have to reenact RFRA, or enact a law similar to RFRA; that
is, Congress would have to make all state and local laws and practices, however
nondiscriminatory they might be, presumptively invalid to the extent that they
substantially burden religious conduct. As Boerne makes clear, Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment cannot support such legislation, but Boerne does
not foreclose the use of other sources of congressional power. In the aftermath
of Boerne, two possible sources of power have been suggested: Congress's
power to regulate interstate commerce9" and its power to implement treaties.99
97. Professor Thomas C. Berg has suggested that Congress might rely on Section 5 as the
basis for protecting religious practices implicating "hybrid" constitutional claims, which the
Supreme Court excluded from the restrictive approach that it adopted in Smith. See supra note
16. In particular, Professor Berg argues that Congress could "find that religious practices in
certain areas implicate one of the 'hybrid rights' preserved in Smith: religion combined with
rights of speech, association, parental control over education, and presumably other
constitutional interests such as property rights." House Committee Hearing on Post-Boerne
Legislation, supra note 7 (testimony of Thomas C. Berg). Professor Michael Stokes Paulsen
goes further, arguing that "Congress should ... identify and restate those areas where the Court
has reaffirmed Free Exercise Clause and hybrid rights," including not only a variety of hybrid
situations, but also situations requiring the protection of religious belief or religious expression,
the autonomy of religious institutions, or religious practices in the context of a governmental
system of individual exemptions. See Senate Committee Hearing on Post-Boerne Legislation,
supra note 76. Paulsen also suggests that Congress "could make explicit legislative findings
specifying that certain categories of asserted governmental interests do not suffice to state a
'compelling' interest ..... Id. (testimony of Michael Stokes Paulsen) (emphasis in original).
But it would appear that legislation along the lines suggested by Professors Berg and Paulsen
either would do no more than protect religious practices that the Supreme Court would protect
independently, or else it would exceed the limits of Congress's Section 5 power by redefining
the substantive meaning of the Constitution.
Professor Paulsen's testimony goes on to suggest procedural and remedial provisions that
clearly would do more than protect what the Supreme Court would protect independently. See
id. But these provisions, combined with a congressional attempt to "identify and restate" the
Supreme Court's constitutional doctrine in a manner favorable to religious freedom, would only
increase the risk that the Court would find the legislation unconstitutional.
98. See, e.g., House Committee Hearing on Post-Boerne Legislation, supra note 7
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1. Congress's Power Over Interstate Commerce
During the twentieth century, Congress's power over interstate
commerce'0° has been interpreted to justify broad and far-reaching federal
legislation. Utilizing this power, Congress has addressed various sorts of
economic problems,'' but its power has not been limited to the pursuit of
economic objectives. For example, Congress relied primarily on the
Commerce Clause in its enactment of Title 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
which prohibited racial and religious discrimination in places of public
accommodation, and the Supreme Court upheld the law on that basis.'0 2
Like its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause is broad. As the Supreme Court explained
in United States v. Lopez,0 3 Congress has the power not only to regulate and
protect the channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce, a power not
relevant here, but also "the power to regulate those activities having a
substantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that
substantially affect interstate commerce."' 4 In essence, this latter power gives
Congress the ability to regulate local activities, as long as those activities have
a substantial effect on the national economy. In determining the
"substantiality" of the effect, moreover, Congress need not focus on the
individual impact of any particular local activity; rather, it can aggregate the
effect of all the local activities the law is designed to regulate.'0 5 Congressional
judgments of this sort will be upheld as long as they are "rational,"' 106 giving
Congress the same degree of discretion as it has under Section 5.
(testimony of Thomas C. Berg); id. (testimony of Douglas Laycock); id. (testimony of Marc
D. Stem); Senate Committee Hearing on Post-Boerne Legislation, supra note 76 (testimony
of Erwin Chemerinsky).
99. See, e.g., House Committee Hearing on Post-Boerne Legislation, supra note 7
(testimony of Douglas Laycock).
100. "The Congress shall have Power... to regulate Commerce... among the several
States .... U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
101. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. I (1937); United States
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 1 11(1942); Perez v. United
States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
102. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
103. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
104. Id. at 558-59 (citation omitted).
105. See Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942); see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556.
106. "[W]here we find that the legislators, in light of the facts and testimony before them,
have a rational basis for finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of
commerce, our investigation is at an end." Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04
(1964). See also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Rel. Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981);
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557.
[Vol. 20
CONGRESSIONAL ALTERNATIVES
As Boerne made clear for Section 5, broad discretion does not mean
unlimited license.'0 7 And what Boerne is to Section 5, Lopez is to the
Commerce Clause.10 8  Thus, in Lopez, the Supreme Court ruled that the
Commerce Clause did not justify a congressional attempt to ban the possession
of guns in the vicinity of schools.'O The Court noted that the activity being
regulated, that of gun possession (not sale), was in no sense "commercial" or
"'economic. ' '1 ° Although its opinion is subject to interpretation,' the Court
suggested that the Commerce Clause ordinarily does not authorize the
regulation of non-economic activity, even if that activity affects interstate
commerce. At the very least, Lopez means that any congressional attempt to
regulate such activity will be subject to serious judicial scrutiny." 2 Thus, the
Court will not regard a congressional attempt to regulate non-economic activity
as a "rational" regulation of interstate commerce unless the non-economic
107. See supra Part I.
108. Cf John M.A. DiPippa, The Death and Resurrection of RFRA: Integrating Lopez and
Boerne, 20 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L.J. 767, pt. VI (1998) (arguing that Boerne and Lopez, taken
together, suggest a new, unified standard for the review of congressional legislation challenged
on federalistic grounds).
109. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
110. The Court explained:
Where economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation
regulating that activity will be sustained.
Even Wickard [Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding federal
wheat-farming quotas as applied to the production and consumption of homegrown
wheat)], which is perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause
authority over intrastate activity, involved economic activity in a way that the
possession of a gun in a school zone does not ....
[The gun-possession statute] is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing
to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one
might define those terms.
Id. at 560-61. See id. at 551 ("The Act neither regulates a commercial activity nor contains a
requirement that the possession be connected in any way to interstate commerce.").
111. The five-justice majority opinion is ambiguous in its own right. In addition, there is
a concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O'Connor, which could be read to
limit the reach of the Court's decision. In this concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy emphasized
that the congressional law in question intruded upon education, "an area of traditional state
concern." Id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring). "The statute now before us," he wrote,
"forecloses the States from experimenting and exercising their own judgment in an area to
which States lay claim by right of history and expertise, and it does so by regulating an activity
beyond the realm of commerce in the ordinary and usual sense of that term." Id. at 583
(Kennedy, J., concurring). Kennedy's opinion could be read to imply that Congress might have
greater leeway in regulating other matters, not traditionally reserved to the states--perhaps even
if those matters are not commercial or economic in nature. See id. at 580-83 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
112. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer noted that the Court was making a "critical
distinction" between commercial and non-commercial activities, a distinction that he believed
to be ill-conceived. See id. at 627-30 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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activity has an adverse effect on the national economy that is not only
substantial, but also direct and demonstrable. 
3
As the Court conceded in Lopez, the line between economic and non-
economic activity can be difficult to draw."4 Depending on where and how
one draws the line, however, Lopez may present a problem for RFRA-like
legislation grounded on the Commerce Clause. Religious conduct sometimes
is economic conduct as well," 5 but this is not the ordinary situation." 6 In any
event, to focus on the potentially economic character of some religious conduct
might be to miss the point. Read literally, Lopez suggests that the critical
question is whether the activity being regulated by Congress is or is not
economic. In RFRA-like legislation, Congress is not regulating religious
conduct, but rather is protecting it from state and local regulation. What
Congress is regulating, in reality, is the state and local regulation that the
congressional law is designed to restrain. The Court might regard this state and
local activity not as economic, but rather as governmental or regulatory--even
though the state and local activity might itself be regulating private conduct of
an economic (as well as religious) nature.
113. In Lopez, the government argued that Congress should be permitted to regulate gun
possession in the vicinity of schools because this activity not only contributes to the economic
cost of crime in general, but also impairs the educational process, thereby leading to a long-term
decline in the economic productivity of American citizens. In his dissenting opinion, Justice
Breyer accepted this argument. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 618-25 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The
majority did not deny that a link to interstate commerce might be present, but it determined that
any such link was too attenuated to support the exercise of congressional power. Id. at 563-65
(majority opinion); cf. id. at 567 ("To uphold the Government's contentions here, we would
have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the
States.").
The majority also noted the absence of relevant congressional findings on the asserted
link to interstate commerce, although it left the potential significance of such findings open to
question. See id. at 563 ("[T]o the extent that congressional findings would enable us. to
evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate
commerce, even though no such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye, they are lacking
here."); see also id. at 612-14 (Souter, J., dissenting) (discussing the potential role of
congressional findings).
114. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566 (majority opinion); see also id. at 627-30 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
115. Cf. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 117 S. Ct. 1590, 1596-97
(1997) (holding that a church camp was engaged in interstate commerce and therefore was
protected by the dormant Commerce Clause); see generally id. at 1602 ("We see no reason why
the nonprofit character of an enterprise should exclude it from the coverage of either the
affirmative or the negative aspect of the Commerce Clause.").
116. Cf House Committee Hearing on Post-Boerne Legislation, supra note 7 (testimony
of Thomas C. Berg) (suggesting that individual religious practices rarely are economic in
nature, but that institutional religious practices more often are, because religious institutions




If the Supreme Court were to treat the RFRA-like legislation as a
regulation of non-economic activity, the legislation would be extremely
difficult to sustain on the authority of the Commerce Clause. If Lopez ever
permits the regulation of non-economic activity, it is only when the activity has
an adverse effect on the national economy that is direct, substantial, and
demonstrable. In certain circumstances, state and local burdens on religious
conduct might have a meaningful effect on the national economy, ' 1 7 but it is
doubtful that that effect--even in the aggregate-would be sufficiently direct
and substantial to satisfy the scrutiny that Lopez appears to contemplate for
congressional attempts to regulate non-economic activity.
Although this analysis might follow from a literal reading of Lopez, a
literal reading of the Court's opinion might be unduly restrictive. At least in
some situations, Congress surely is permitted to protect private economic
activity from unduly burdensome state regulation by enacting federal laws that
govern the field and preempt state law to the contrary. Perhaps the Supreme
Court would see RFRA-like legislation to be serving a similar function to the
extent that it protected conduct that was economic as well as religious, and this
might serve to immunize the legislation from an attack based on Lopez. On the
other hand, Lopez certainly signals renewed attention to the judicial
enforcement of limitations on the Commerce Clause. As the Court noted in
Lopez, moreover, even its prior precedents would not support Congress's "use
[of] a relatively trivial impact on commerce as an excuse for broad general
regulation of state or private activities.""' Thus, even if Lopez permitted a
RFRA-like law to be applied upon a showing that particular governmental
burdens on religion actually had a significant economic impact," 9 this would
leave the congressional legislation invalid or inapplicable in many or most of
the situations that RFRA itself was designed to address.
20
117. Cf. House Committee Hearing on Post-Boerne Legislation, supra note 7 (testimony
of Douglas Laycock) (arguing that governmental regulations preventing the building of
churches or affecting the operation of religious hospitals can have a significant effect on
interstate commerce); id. (testimony of Marc D. Stem) (suggesting that state regulations
burdening particular religious practices, such as the drinking of communion wine by minors or
the observation of Jewish holidays, might make the states maintaining those regulations
unattractive to the affected religious believers, thereby discouraging interstate travel and
migration and impairing interstate commerce).
18. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 n.27 (1968)).
119. Cf. House Committee Hearing on Post-Boerne Legislation, supra note 7 (testimony
of Douglas Laycock) (arguing that "Congress could enact RFRA's level of protection for
religious practices affecting commerce").
120. Rather than frame its legislation broadly, Congress might attempt to draft legislation
that limited its coverage to those situations in which governmental burdens on religion actually
had a significant economic impact. But if Congress were to move in this direction, it might well
be difficult to develop statutory language that would both (a) support the Commerce Clause
theory of congressional power and (b) address the non-economic burdens about which Congress
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As this analysis suggests, Lopez might well require the invalidation of
RFRA-like legislation grounded on the Commerce Clause, at least in many or
most of its applications. In addition to Lopez, moreover, there is an
independent constitutional difficulty that such legislation would face: it
probably would violate state sovereignty, as protected by the Supreme Court's
decisions in New York v. United States 21 and Printz v. United States.
1 22
Congress typically uses the Commerce Clause to regulate private-sector
activities, although it sometimes extends the same regulations to state and local
governments as well. When Congress is primarily engaged in the regulation
of private-sector activities, laws that survive Lopez are constitutionally valid
without further analysis.23 As the Supreme Court explained in New York and
confirmed in Printz, however, it is one thing for Congress to extend private-
sector regulations to the comparable activities of state and local governments;
it is something altogether different, and constitutionally more troubling, for
Congress to address its legislation to government alone, effectively requiring
state and local bodies to govern in a particular way. 124
"[T]he Framers explicitly chose a Constitution that confers upon Congress
the power to regulate individuals, not States," the Court wrote in New York.
25
Thus, "While Congress has substantial powers to govern the Nation directly,
including in areas of intimate concern to the States, the Constitution has never
been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the States to
govern according to Congress' instructions."' 26 The Court elaborated in Printz:
"[T]he Framers rejected the concept of a central government that would act
upon and through the States, and instead designed a system in which the state
presumably is most concemed--that is, burdens resulting not from the economic costs of
governmental regulation, but rather from the conflicts that can arise when secular obligations
conflict with the demands of religious conscience. Legislation granting religion-specific relief
from burdens that are merely economic, moreover, might also present serious issues under the
Establishment Clause. See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (invalidating a
Texas sales tax exemption that was granted to religious literature, but not to other literature);
see generally supra note 77.
121. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
122. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
123. This is true as long as the Supreme Court adheres to Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). In Garcia, the Court discarded the
doctrine of National League ofCities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), which had provided some
special protection for state and local governments even from general federal laws that applied
to the private and public sectors alike. The Court's more recent decisions in cases like New
York and Printz may make the current validity of Garcia an open question. See generally infra
notes 222-227 and accompanying text (discussing the trend of recent Supreme Court decisions
reinvigorating constitutional federalism).
124. See New York, 505 U.S. at 160-61, 177-78; Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2383.
125. New York, 505 U.S. at 166.
126. Id. at 162.
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and federal governments would exercise concurrent authority over the
people--who were, in Hamilton's words, 'the only proper objects of
government.' '1 27 As a result, "the Federal Government may not compel the
States to implement, by legislation or executive action, federal regulatory
programs."'
128
Although RFRA-like legislation might not directly require state
lawmaking or state executive action, it would appear to violate the basic
principle of state sovereignty that New York and Printz are designed to protect.
In particular, such legislation would be targeted at state and local
governments, 129 and, in effect, it would mandate that state and local laws and
executive actions include religion-based exemptions in accordance with
congressionally mandated criteria. 3 The Supreme Court would be unlikely
to countenance this substantial intrusion on state sovereignty. 3'
127. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2377 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 109 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
128. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2380.
129. Professor Thomas C. Berg has noted that as long as Congress continued to apply the
provisions of RFRA, or of RFRA-like legislation, to federal laws and practices as well as state
and local ones, Congress in fact would not be "singl[ing] out the states for regulation" because
"the whole federal government [would be] subject to the same rule." House Committee Hearing
on Post-Boerne Legislation, supra note 7 (testimony of Thomas C. Berg); see 42 U.S.C. §§
2000bb-2(1) & (2), 2000bb-3(a) & (1) (1994) (extending RFRA's coverage to federal laws and
practices); see also supra note 5. This observation, however, misses the point of New York and
Printz; even if the federal legislation continued to apply to the federal government's own
activities, it presumably would not apply to the private sector, and it therefore would not
"govern the Nation directly." See New York, 505 U.S. at 162.
Even if the federal legislation were somehow crafted to extend to certain private-sector
activity, moreover, this might not save the legislation from a state-sovereignty challenge-
especially not if the legislation's primary focus continued to be governmental activity. See
generally supra note 123 (raising the question of whether Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), remains a viable precedent).
130. In his contribution to this symposium, Professor Berg suggests that RFRA-like
legislation should be seen as nothing more than a "deregulatory statute" that "displaces" state
law. See Berg, supra note 76, at part III.C. But such legislation would not merely deregulate
a field or displace state law. Instead, it would affirmatively require state and local governmental
bodies to govern in a particular way; thus, whenever they were confronted with claims for
religion-based exemptions, the state and local bodies would be required to apply
congressionally mandated standards and, in accordance with those standards, to recognize and
grant exemptions that they otherwise would be free to reject. Like RFRA itself, such legislation
would thereby "substantively coerce[] states into respecting religious liberty, within state
institutions, as a matter of federal policy." Lupu, supra note 8, at 214.
131. The state-sovereignty doctrine of New York and Printz is a matter of constitutional
principle that appears to be largely unaffected by the degree to which the federal law intrudes
on state and local prerogatives. To the extent that the degree of the intrusion is relevant,
however, the intrusion caused by RFRA-like legislation surely would be no less than the
relatively modest intrusion that the Court found impermissible in Printz. See Printz, 117 S. Ct.
at 2397 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the federal gun control provisions invalidated in
Printz, which required state officials to perform background checks and related tasks on an
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As I have suggested, the state-sovereignty doctrine of New York and
Printz is independent from the basic Commerce Clause analysis of Lopez.
Considered separately, either line of attack could lead to the invalidation of
RFRA-like legislation. Taken together, they would make this result extremely
likely, if not inevitable. Indeed, the two lines of reasoning might coalesce.
Thus, the Supreme Court's analysis might be as follows: congressional
lawmaking that regulates state and local governmental activity is not a
regulation of commercial or economic activity, and it therefore is not a
permissible regulation of "interstate commerce"; at the same time, and
precisely because of its focus on state and local governmental action, it is an
impermissible intrusion on state sovereignty. In support of this reasoning, the
Court might well repeat what it said in New York: "The allocation of power
contained in the Commerce Clause .. . authorizes Congress to regulate
interstate commerce directly; it does not authorize Congress to regulate state
governments' regulation of interstate commerce."
1 32
2. Congress's Power to Implement Treaties
However unlikely it may seem, Congress's power to implement treaties
is a plausible source of authority for RFRA-like legislation- 33 -or at least a
more plausible source than the Commerce Clause. The United States is party
to a treaty that contains a relevant provision, and, to date, the Supreme Court
has not recognized a state-sovereignty limitation on Congress's implementation
power. Even so, this alternative theory of constitutional power certainly is not
free from doubt, and it probably would not support congressional legislation
as broad or as strong as RFRA. Beyond the question of constitutional power,
interim basis, involved only "the imposition of modest duties on individual officers" and
therefore imposed no more than a "trivial burden on state sovereignty").
The Supreme Court's state-sovereignty doctrine limits Congress's power under the
Commerce Clause, but this doctrine does not apply when Congress properly invokes its
enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See City of Rome v. United
States, 446 U.S. 156, 178-80 (1980); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). The
protection of state sovereignty, however, is nonetheless at work in the Court's refusal to give
Congress carte blanche under Section 5. See supra Part I. Thus, by rejecting an unduly
expansive interpretation of Section 5, the Court has limited the ability of Congress to avoid the
constitutional doctrine and policy of cases like New York and Printz. See Conkle, supra note
8, at 70-7 1; cf Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 469 (1991) ("[T]he Fourteenth Amendment
does not override all principles of federalism.").
132. New York, 505 U.S. at 166.
133. This potential source of authority was first identified in an important and enlightening
article by Professor Gerald L. Neuman. See Gerald L. Neuman, The Global Dimension of
RFRA, 14 CONST. CoMM. 33 (1997).
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moreover, this path to RFRA-like legislation might be politically or
prudentially unattractive.
In 1992, the United States Senate approved a major multilateral treaty on
human rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(CCPR)134 According to Article 18 of the CCPR, "Everyone shall have the
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion," including not only
"freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice," but also
"freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or
private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and
teaching." '35 Under Article 18, freedom to believe is absolute.13 6 "Freedom to
manifest one's religion or beliefs" is not, but it "may be subject only to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety,
order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others."'
137
The President and the Senate plainly had the constitutional power to enter into
this treaty, 138 and, as a matter of international law, the United States is obligated
to honor its provisions.1
3 9
In protecting the freedom to manifest one's religion except when
limitations are necessary to serve competing interests such as public safety or
morals, Article 18 of the CCPR appears to call for the protection of religious
freedom, at least to some degree, even from nondiscriminatory, general laws
that have the effect of burdening religious practices. Article 18 thus appears
to demand more protection of religious freedom than is required by the
Supreme Court's decisions in Smith and Boerne.'40 It also appears, however,
that Article 18 is not yet enforceable as part of the domestic law of the United
States, because-according to Senate declaration--the CCPR is not self-
executing. 14' Nonetheless, Congress has the power to implement Article 18 by
134. See 138 CONG. REc. S4781-84 (1992). For a discussion of the CCPR and of the
Senate's long-delayed decision to approve it, see Neuman, supra note 133, at 41-43. For a
collection of essays concerning the treaty and its various provisions, along with an appendix
containing the treaty's complete text, see THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT
ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (Louis Henkin ed., 1981).
135. CCPR art. 18(1).
136. See id. art. 18(2).
137. Id. art. 18(3).
138. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; see also Neuman, supra note 133, at 46 (noting that even
if the treaty power is properly limited to matters of legitimate international concern, "there can
be no doubt today that human rights are among those matters"). The CCPR, as a valid treaty,
is part of the "supreme Law of the Land" under the Constitution's Supremacy Clause. See U.S.
CONST. art. VI.
139. See Neuman, supra note 133, at49.
140. See supra Part I.
141. See Declaration No. 1, 138 CONG. REc. S4784 (1992); see also Neuman, supra note
133, at 43 & n.57 (discussing the declaration and noting that its effectiveness has been
questioned by some scholars).
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virtue of the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution, which authorizes
congressional legislation to implement international treaties such as the
CCPR.'
42
Noting that Congress properly can adapt the provisions of Artiqle 18 to
the American legal system, Professor Gerald L. Neuman has argued that
Congress's treaty-implementing power would support a "verbatim
reenactment" of RFRA that would be within the power of Congress and that
therefore would be constitutionally binding on the states. 143 According to
Neuman, "Congress could reasonably find that the traditional categories of
religious exercise and compelling interest provide[] an appropriate mechanism
for protecting the manifestation of religious beliefs in practice within the legal
system of the United States."'" And any state-sovereignty objection to this
treaty-implementing legislation, writes Neuman, would be foreclosed by the
Supreme Court's 1920 decision in Missouri v. Holland.1
45
Neuman's constitutional argument is creative and interesting, but whether
the Supreme Court would accept it is highly questionable. In the first place,
anything close to a verbatim reenactment of RFRA would appear to go well
beyond what Article 18 requires. Article 18, for example, permits the
government to limit the exercise of religion when the limitation is necessary for
the protection of public morals;' 46 standing alone, this justification surely
would not satisfy the "compelling interest" requirement of RFRA.147 More
generally, the "necessary to protect" inquiry under Article 18' is considerably
more flexible than RFRA's requirement that constraints on religious exercise
be "the least restrictive means"' 149 for furthering the government's compelling
interest.' 50 Thus, as Neuman concedes, "The compelling interest test of RFRA
appears to be more demanding than the standard for 'necessary' limitations
142. This Clause authorizes Congress to enact all legislation that is "necessary and proper
for carrying into Execution ... all... Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government
of the United States." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18. One such power is the treaty power.
143. See Neuman, supra note 133, at 50, 53.
144. Id. at 50.
145. 252 U.S. 416 (1920); see Neuman, supra note 133, at 46,47.
146. See CCPR art. 18(3). According to Alexandre Charles Kiss, "public morals," for
purposes of Article 18 and the rest of the CCPR, "alludes to principles which are not always
legally enforceable but which are accepted by a great majority of the citizens as general
guidelines for their individual and collective behavior. Whether they include acts done in
private, alone, or between consenting adults, has been debated." Alexandre Charles Kiss,
Permissible Limitations on Rights, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 134, at
290, 304. Kiss suggests that a uniform, international conception of public morals may be
impossible, "thus necessitating a margin of appreciation left to the states." Id.
147. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b) (1994).
148. See CCPR art. 18(3).
149. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b) (1994).
150. See Neuman, supra note 133, at 45-46.
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under Article 18."'' Likewise, "RFRA's category of substantial burdens on
the exercise of religion might be broader than the category-of limitations on the
right to manifest one's religion in worship, observance, practice, and
teaching.' 52 Neuman concludes that new legislation tracking the language of
RFRA would nonetheless be a rational implementation of Article 18."' The
Supreme Court might agree, but I think it is more likely that the Court would
conclude otherwise. At the very least, this is a considerably more difficult
question than Neuman appears to believe.
As Lopez suggests, the Supreme Court's review of congressional
rationality may be more intense than usual when the Court perceives a potential
abuse of congressional power.'54 Given the history of Smith, RFRA, and
Boerne,155 moreover, the Court might well see such a problem in a reenactment
of RFRA that was purportedly grounded on Article 18. The CCPR was in
effect when Congress enacted RFRA in 1993,156 but Congress showed no
interest then in implementing its provisions. Rather, Congress wanted to
repudiate Smith, adopt its own understanding of the First Amendment, and
impose that understanding on the states.'57 The primary reasons for a
reenactment of RFRA would be very similar. Although the Supreme Court
would be reluctant to question the motivations of Congress, it might be equally
reluctant to approve a congressional circumvention of the Court's decision in
Boerne.58 As a result, if Congress did little more than reenact the terms of
RFRA, the Court might well conclude that the legislation did not constitute a
rational or reasonable implementation of Article 18.159
151. Neuman, supra note 133, at 50.
152. Neuman, supra note 133, at 50. At the same time, in other respects, a full
implementation of Article 18 would go beyond the protections embodied in RFRA. Unlike
RFRA, Article 18 protects the manifestation of nonreligious beliefs, and it extends its
protections to private as well as governmental interference. See id. For an argument that the
United States would be well-advised to follow the approach of Article 18 insofar as it extends
its protections to matters of non-religious conscience, see Rodney K. Smith, Converting the
Religious Equality Amendment into a Statute with a Little "Conscience," 1996 BYU L. REV.
645, 657 & n.42. For further discussion of Article 18, see, for example, Karl Josef Partsch,
Freedom of Conscience and Expression, and Political Freedoms, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL
OF RIGHTS, supra note 134, at 209, 210-16.
153. See Neuman, supra note 133, at 50.
154. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
155. See supra Part I.
156. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
158. Cf Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. [The Child-Labor Tax Case], 259 U.S. 20 (1922)
(invalidating congressional legislation, grounded on the taxing power, that had been enacted
in response to Hammer v. Dagenhart [The Child Labor Case], 247 U.S. 251 (1918), which had
previously invalidated very similar legislation grounded on the Commerce Clause).
159. Cf. House Committee Hearing on Post-Boerne Legislation, supra note 7 (testimony
of Douglas Laycock) (arguing that Congress should not "simply re-enact RFRA and declare it
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Beyond the question of congressional rationality, there is the question of
state sovereignty. As Professor Neuman observes, Missouri v. Holland160 can
be read to preclude a state-sovereignty objection to treaty-implementing
legislation, and therefore to RFRA-like legislation enacted on this basis.'
61
Once again, however, the question is substantially more troublesome than
Neuman allows, and there are reasons to doubt whether Holland would be
extended in this manner.
In Holland, Congress had enacted a statute that prohibited the killing,
capturing, or selling of migratory birds that passed over portions of the United
States and Canada, this in accordance with the terms of a treaty between the
United States and Great Britain. 62 Missouri objected to this exercise of
congressional power, claiming that it was the "owner" of wild birds within its
territory and that the conditions for their hunting properly were governed by
Missouri's own laws. 163 In rejecting Missouri's position, the Supreme Court
broadly affirmed the power of Congress to implement treaties, and it
specifically rejected the argument that the statute in question was "forbidden
by some invisible radiation from the general terms of the Tenth
Amendment."' 64 But the Court did not reject the federalism argument out of
hand. Rather, it balanced the competing interests that were at stake. As against
Missouri's interest in wild birds that were only "transitorily within the State,"
the "national interest" was "of very nearly the first magnitude" and could "be
protected only by national action in concert with that of another power."'
165
Whether a similar conclusion would or should be reached for RFRA-like
legislation is an open question. The state regulatory interests that would be
impaired by RFRA-like legislation are in no way limited to a transitory subject
matter. At the same time, the need for concerted national and international
action is less obvious; it is hardly self-evident that religious freedom in the
American states will be inadequately protected in the absence of federal
legislation implementing the CCPR.
The states' rights argument rejected in Holland, moreover, was not really
a state-sovereignty argument of the quality or strength that could be invoked
to be an implementation of the [CCPR]" because that would lead to "arguments about whether
the implementing legislation went further than the Covenant and whether the power to
implement treaties includes the power to go further--the same arguments we had over RFRA").
160. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
161. See Neuman, supra note 133, at 46,47.
162. See Holland, 252 U.S. at 431-32.
163. See id. at 431,434.
164. Id. at 434; see U.S. CONST. amend. X ('The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people.").
165. See Holland, 252 U.S. at435.
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against RFRA-like legislation. In particular, the statute approved in Holland
was a statute through which the federal government was directly regulating the
activities of private individuals; the federalism objection, in essence, was
nothing more than an objection to the federal statute's preemption of state law.
As such, the Court found the challenge unpersuasive: "As most of the laws of
the United States are carried out within the States and as many of them deal
with matters which in the silence of such laws the State might regulate, such
general grounds are not enough to support Missouri's claim.... No doubt the
great body of private relations usually fall within the control of the State, but
a treaty may override its power."'
' 66
RFRA-like legislation, by contrast, would be directed to governmental
action, effectively requiring state and local bodies to govern in a particular
way. To compare these situations to the Commerce Clause cases, Holland is
like Lopez, a case in which no independent, state-sovereignty objection was
available. 167 RFRA-like legislation, on the other hand, would be like the
legislation invalidated in New York and Printz.168 Important national and
international interests sometimes may require treaty-implementing legislation
that is directed specifically to state and local governmental action,169 and it
therefore would be wrong to conclude that such legislation is categorically
barred by New York and Printz. Nonetheless, the New YorklPrintz problem
was not addressed in Holland, and the constitutional policy that undergirds
these cases might well support the protection of states' rights if the Court, as
in Holland, elects to adopt a balancing approach. In these circumstances,
following language from De Geofroy v. Riggs, 70 the Supreme Court might find
that Congress's treaty-implementing power is limited by a restraint "arising
from the nature of the government itself and of that of the States."'
' 7
'
166. Id. at 434.
167. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. Indeed, an objection to the federal
preemption of private-sector regulation, without more, is the weakest sort of federalism claim.
Thus, even under the now-discarded states' rights doctrine of National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), the Supreme Court refused to accept such claims, noting that they
did not involve the federal regulation of "States as States." See Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Rel. Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 283-93 (1981); see generally Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (overruling National League of Cities).
168. See supra notes 124-131 and accompanying text.
169. Cf Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924) (upholding and applying treaty provisions
that prevented state and local governments from discriminating against Japanese nationals with
respect to their trade or business activities in the United States); De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S.
258 (1890) (upholding and applying treaty provisions that protected French nationals from
certain state-imposed disabilities in the disposition and inheritance of property); Hauenstein v.
Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1880) (upholding and applying treaty provisions that protected Swiss
nationals from state-imposed inheritance disabilities).
170. 133 U.S. 258 (1890).
171. Id. at 267. ("It would not be contended that [the treaty power] extends so far as to
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As with RFRA-like legislation grounded on the Commerce Clause, 17 2
treaty-implementing legislation amounting to anything like a verbatim
reenactment of RFRA probably would be invalidated on the basis of one or
both of two lines of argument: that the legislation goes beyond the limits of
congressional rationality and that it infringes state sovereignty. In the treaty-
implementing context, however, Congress could substantially diminish the risk
of invalidation by adopting a weakened form of RFRA-like legislation,
grounded not in the language of "substantial burden," "compelling interest,"
and "least restrictive means," but instead in language reflecting the more
flexible approach of Article 18 of the CCPR.173 This would reduce the
appearance of illicit congressional circumvention of Boerne, and the statute
would be more readily upheld as a reasonable implementation of Article 18.
At the same time, precisely because it would be less intrusive on the states, the
statute would be less vulnerable to a state-sovereignty objection. Although not
entirely free from constitutional doubt, this form of RFRA-like legislation
would be likely to survive a judicial challenge.
In addition to the various constitutional issues surrounding Congress's
treaty-implementing power, there are political or prudential questions that
Congress would need to consider before invoking this power as the basis for
RFRA-like legislation. On the one hand, as I have just argued, legislation
grounded on this power probably would not be constitutionally sustainable
unless it were substantially weaker than RFRA. This weaker form of
legislation, however, would protect religious freedom only to a limited degree,
and the full objective of RFRA would remain unfulfilled. 74
authorize what the Constitution forbids .... ). This language from De Geofroy was quoted
with approval in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17 (1957) (plurality opinion). With no justice
objecting on this point, the plurality in Reid declared that "no agreement with a foreign nation
can confer power on the Congress... which is free from the restraints of the Constitution." Id.
at 16. See id. at 17 ("This Court has regularly and uniformly recognized the supremacy of the
Constitution over a treaty.").
172. See supra Part II.B.I.
173. Professor Douglas Laycock has argued that the standard under Article 18 "is
something less than the compelling interest test, but it is certainly more than rational basis."
House Committee Hearing on Post-Boerne Legislation, supra note 7 (testimony of Douglas
Laycock). As a result, he suggests that "[p]erhaps the best translation into American legal
traditions is intermediate scrutiny--substantially related to an important governmental
objective. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)." House Committee Hearing on Post-
Boerne Legislation, supra note 7 (testimony of Douglas Laycock). If Laycock is right,
Congress would have the constitutional power to adopt a treaty-implementing statute "requiring
something like intermediate scrutiny for burdens on religious practice." Id. The safest form
of treaty-implementing legislation, however, would avoid this sort of translation altogether;
instead, it would simply track the language of Article 18.
174. But cf Neuman, supra note 133, at 53 (suggesting that a more moderate and flexible
approach to religious exemptions "may be normatively more attractive than the compelling
interest model that RFRA appears to embody").
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On the other hand, and conversely, Congress--making its own judgment
about the importance of American federalism---might well be reluctant to use
its treaty-implementing power to impose any new requirements on the states.
In approving the CCPR, the Senate included an "understanding" on federalism,
noting that the CCPR would be "implemented by the Federal Government to
the extent that it exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the matters
covered therein, and otherwise by the state and local governments," with the
federal government taking "measures appropriate to the Federal system to the
end that the competent authorities of the state or local government may take
appropriate measures for the fulfillment of the [CCPR].' 175 Although the
precise meaning and effect of this understanding are unclear,176 it at least
"signal[s] the political reality that some members of Congress are reluctant to
exercise ... federal power to enforce the CCPR in areas of traditional state
regulation."'
177
In summary, Congress's power to implement treaties might support a
weakened form of RFRA-like legislation, but it probably would not support
legislation as broad or as strong as RFRA itself. In addition, there are political
or prudential reasons for Congress to be reluctant to invoke this power. Like
the Commerce Clause, then, the treaty-implementing power is a doubtful basis
for congressional action.
78
175. Understanding No. 5, 138 CoNG. REc. S4784 (1992).
176. See Neuman, supra note 133, at 51-52.
177. Id. at 52-53. Congress has long been sensitive to the question of whether the federal
government's power to make and implement treaties could work to undermine our federal
system. In the 1950's, for example, Congress seriously considered-but ultimately rejected-a
proposed constitutional amendment to formally limit the scope of this power. See NOWAK &
ROTUNDA, supra note 31, at 219 (discussing the proposed Bricker Amendment); GERALD
GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 255-56 (13th ed. 1997)
(suggesting that the congressional concerns reflected in the Bricker Amendment were assuaged,
in part, by the reassuring language of Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); see supra note 171).
For an argument that this congressional sensitivity might be well-advised and that it might
properly be extended to questions of religious freedom, see Marci A. Hamilton, Slouching
Toward Globalization: Charting the Pitfalls in the Drive to Internationalize Religious Human
Rights, 46 EMORY L.J. 307 (1997) (review essay, reviewing RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (John Witte, Jr. & Johan D. van der Vyver eds., 1996)) (arguing that the
internationalization of religious human rights, at least if extended to the United States, could
jeopardize not only federalism, but also popular sovereignty and the containment of power that
results from its dispersal among various public and private actors).
178. Beyond the constitutional limitations that I have discussed in the text, the Eleventh
Amendment would further restrict the ability of Congress to authorize federal-court remedies
against the states. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI; I ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 86, § 2.12.
Under Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996), legislation grounded on
Congress's power over interstate commerce cannot abrogate the Eleventh Amendment
immunity of the states. Like its power over interstate commerce, moreover, Congress's power
to implement treaties is based upon Article I of the Constitution. As a result, it would seem that
Seminole Tribe would preclude Congress from abrogating Eleventh Amendment immunity in
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C. Spending-Power Legislation Imposing RFRA-Like Conditions on the
Receipt of Federal Funding
As we have seen, Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment does not
authorize Congress to protect religious practices from state and local laws of
general application.7 9 In all likelihood, neither does the Commerce Clause. 80
Congress's power to implement treaties is more plausible, but there are reasons
to doubt the constitutionality, as well as the political or prudential
attractiveness, of congressional reliance on this source of authority.' Due to
the inadequacies of these various sources of power, it may be that Congress
cannot directly accomplish the basic objective of RFRA; that is, it may be that
Congress cannot directly regulate state and local laws and practices that burden
religious conduct in a nondiscriminatory way.
Even if Congress cannot directly accomplish the basic objective of RFRA,
however, it might be able to pursue this objective through indirect means. In
particular, Congress might be able to impose conditions on the receipt of
federal funding by state and local governments, thereby inducing-but not
directly requiring--those governments to honor RFRA-like standards in
protecting religious conduct even from general laws and practices.
1. The Breadth of the Spending Power
Under the Spending Clause of the Constitution, Congress is authorized "to
pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the
United States."'' 92 This congressional power to spend public monies is a
separate and independent power, and it is not limited to the fields of
permissible congressional regulation that are specified elsewhere in the
Constitution.'83 Congress's power to spend, moreover, implicitly includes the
power to restrict the use of its appropriations and to impose conditions that
recipients must honor if they choose to accept the federal funding.
the adoption of RFRA-like legislation grounded on either of these two sources of congressional
power.
179. See supra Parts I.C & II.A.
180. See supra Part II.B. 1.
181. See supra Part II.B.2.
182. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
183. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987). The Supreme Court first
endorsed this view in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936), thereby accepting the view of




State and local governments receive federal funds under a variety of
congressional programs,' and the funds often come with strings attached.8 5
If, in awarding a particular grant, Congress merely "'specifies in some way
how the money should be spent,' 18 6 its power under the Spending Clause is
clear.187  Beyond this, Congress also is free to impose more independent
conditions on state and local governments. In particular, Congress is free to
require, at least to some degree, that states accept or adopt particular legal
regimes if they wish to be eligible for federal funding. As the Supreme Court
has explained, "legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in
the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply
with federally imposed conditions."' 8 Because of the contractual nature of the
obligations that states agree to assume, these obligations perhaps should not be
regarded as matters of federal law, at least not in the ordinary sense. Instead,
these obligations-whatever their form-might best be regarded as matters
essentially of state law.18 9
South Dakota v. Dole'90 illustrates the breadth of Congress's power under
the Spending Clause. Under the National Minimum Drinking Age Amendment
of 1984,'9' Congress directed the federal Secretary of Transportation to
withhold five percent of a state's otherwise allocable highway funds if, as a
matter of state law, the state did not prohibit the purchase of alcoholic
beverages by persons under the age of twenty-one. 92 South Dakota, which
184. Indeed, at least until recently, "[flederal funds totaling billions of dollars each year
[have] constitute[d] an increasingly large proportion of each state's revenue." Lynn A. Baker,
Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLuM. L. REv. 1911, 1918 (1995).
185. See I ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 86, § 5.7(b).
186. Dole, 483 U.S. at 216 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief for the National
Conference of State Legislatures et al. as Amicus Curiae).
187. Dissenting in Dole, Justice O'Connor argued that the Supreme Court's approach to
the Spending Clause is far too permissive. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 212-18 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). Even so, she agreed that Congress is entirely free to specify how its own
appropriations 'should be spent. See id. at 215-17.
188. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
189. Needless to say, federal funding conditions certainly reflect federal policies. But as
Professor David E. Engdahl has explained, these conditions "in their essence are creatures of
contract." David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1, 71 (1994). As a result,
Engdahl argues, "their only force is contractual," and they should not be regarded as "Laws of
the United States" within the meaning of the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2. See
id.; see also id. at 62-78. But see William Van Alstyne, "Thirty Pieces of Silver"for the Rights
of Your People: Irresistible Offers Reconsidered as a Matter of State Constitutional Law, 16
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 303, 322-26 (1993) (arguing that some forms of spending
conditions-those that by their terms do not require the states to adopt or maintain any
particular state laws-are properly regarded as matters of federal law).
190. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
191. 23 U.S.C. § 158 (1988).
192. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 205, 211.
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permitted nineteen-year-olds and twenty-year-olds to purchase certain types of
beer,'93 challenged the congressional statute as a coercive and illicit attempt to
require the state to change its own law."9 In a broadly worded opinion, the
Supreme Court rejected South Dakota's challenge, holding that the designated
federal funds could be withheld from South Dakota unless and until its law was
amended. 19'
The Court in Dole denied that the spending power is "unlimited,"' 96 and
it noted a number of requirements for its legitimate use. Several of the Court's
requirements, however, are so easily satisfied that they provide no serious
limitation on the exercise of congressional power. In particular, Congress
readily can satisfy Dole's requirements that it act in pursuit of the general
welfare; that it express its conditions unambiguously; and that it not induce the
states to enact legislation that would otherwise violate the Constitution. 19' If
there are meaningful constitutional restrictions on the spending power, they
come in the form of two other potential limitations, each of which is mentioned
in Dole.
First, the Court suggested a "relatedness" limitation, stating that
"conditions on federal grants might be illegitimate if they are unrelated 'to the
federal interest in particular national projects or programs."" 98 The Court
concluded that this was not a problem in Dole, however, finding that the
drinking-age condition was "directly related to one of the main purposes for
which highway funds are expended-safe interstate travel."' 99 Second, the
Court identified a "non-coercion" limitation, noting that "in some
circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so
coercive as to pass the point at which 'pressure turns into compulsion.' 200 But
193. See id. at 205.
194. See id.
195. See id. at 211-12.
196. Id. at 207.
197. See id. at 207-08, 210; see also id. at 209 (rejecting South Dakota's argument that the
"independent constitutional bar" limitation on the spending power should be read more broadly,
and that the congressional legislation in Dole should accordingly be found to violate the
Twenty-First Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XXI).
198. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444 (1978)
(plurality opinion)). The Supreme Court used stronger language in New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144 (1992), stating that spending conditions "must (among other requirements) bear
some relationship to the purpose of the federal spending; otherwise, of course, the spending
power could render academic the Constitution's other grants and limits of federal authority."
Id. at 167 (citations omitted). For an argument that the relatedness requirement is predicated
upon an improper understanding of the spending power, see Engdahl, supra note 189, at 54-62.
199. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208. The Court noted that in the absence of uniform requirements,
young people might be inclined to drink and drive while commuting to a neighboring state with
a lower drinking age. See id. at 209.
200. Id. at 211 (quoting Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)); cf
[Vol. 20
CONGRESSIONAL ALTERNATIVES
once again, this was not a problem in the case at hand. Describing the five
percent financial incentive as "relatively minor encouragement," the Court
declared South Dakota's coercion argument "more rhetoric than fact." '° The
Court concluded that the enactment of drinking-age laws "remains the
prerogative of the States not merely in theory but in fact."' 02
As long as the congressional action stops short of coercion, moreover, the
state-sovereignty doctrine of New York and Printz0 3 does not apply to
conditional spending. Thus, in this context, Congress is free to target state
governments for special conditions--such as the condition upheld in
Dole--that are not imposed on the private sector. According to the Court in
Dole, sovereignty remains in the states because they have a choice: accept the
grant, and with it the condition, or reject the grant, and thereby refuse to yield
to the congressional pressure. ' 4 As the Court stated in Bell v. New Jersey, °5
"Requiring States to honor the obligations voluntarily assumed as a condition
of federal funding before recognizing their ownership of funds simply does not
intrude on their sovereignty. ' '206 Unlike with direct congressional regulation,
conditional spending programs leave state officials politically accountable for
their actions. "Where Congress encourages state regulation rather than
compelling it," the Court wrote in New York, "state governments remain
responsive to the local electorate's preferences; state officials remain
accountable to the people.
20 7
Sovereignty remains with the states and state officials remain accountable
to their constituents, of course, only in the absence of coercion. And it remains
possible that conditional spending, in certain contexts, might be impermissibly
coercive. Likewise, particular conditions might be so far removed from the
purpose of the congressional funding as to be invalid on that basis. The Court
reiterated in New York that Congress's power under the Spending Clause is not
without limit; "otherwise," the Court wrote, "the spending power could render
Engdahl, supra note 189, at 79-86 (arguing that concerns about coercion might usefully be
addressed in terms of the contractual concepts of "unconscionability" and "public policy").
201. Dole. 483 U.S. at 211.
202. ld. at 211-12.
203. See supra notes 124-31 and accompanying text.
204. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 210; see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168
(1992) ("If a State's citizens view federal policy as sufficiently contrary to local interests, they
may elect to decline a federal grant.").
205. 461 U.S. 773 (1983).
206. Id. at 790.
207. New York, 505 U.S. at 168. By contrast, the Court continued, "where the Federal
Government directs the States to regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of
public disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain
insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision. Accountability is thus diminished
.... " Id. at 169.
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academic the Constitution's other grants and limits of federal authority. 2 8
Thus, "relatedness" and "non-coercion" continue to stand as potential
limitations on the spending power. It is important to note, however, that
neither was a bar to the conditional spending upheld in Dole, despite a
reasonable argument to the contrary with respect to each.209 The Court's
language in Dole and New York suggests that the Court will not forego all
scrutiny of conditional spending, but its holding in Dole implies that this
scrutiny will lead to invalidation, if at all, only in the most extreme cases.
21 0
2. The Permissibility of RFRA-Like Spending Conditions
Given the breadth of the spending power, it is hardly surprising that this
power has been suggested as a means by which Congress might pursue the
objective of RFRA.21  Thus, through conditional spending, Congress might
induce state and local governments to honor RFRA-like standards in protecting
religious conduct even from general laws and practices. This legislative route,
however, is not entirely free from constitutional limitations, and, depending
208. Id. at 167. The Court particularly emphasized the relatedness requirement, stating that
spending conditions "must... bear some relationship to the purpose of the federal spending."
Id.
209. In arguing coercion, South Dakota noted Congress's dramatic success in inducing
states to raise their drinking ages, but the Court rejected this argument, refusing to let the
constitutional question hinge on a conditional grant's "success in achieving the congressional
objective." Dole, 483 U.S. at 211. Indeed, some of the language in Dole, quoted from an
earlier decision, implied that the Court might never find a conditional grant to be
unconstitutionally coercive: '[T]o hold that motive or temptation is equivalent to coercion is
to plunge the law in endless difficulties. The outcome of such a doctrine is the acceptance of
a philosophical determinism by which choice becomes impossible."' Id. (quoting Steward
Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589-90 (1937)).
In concluding that the drinking-age condition was sufficiently related to the highway
funding program, the Court rejected an argument to the contrary by Justice O'Connor. See
Dole, 483 U.S. at 213-14 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that "establishment of a minimum
drinking age of 21 is not sufficiently related to interstate highway construction to justify so
conditioning funds appropriated for that purpose"); see also id. at 213-15 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). The Court left open the question of whether the "relatedness" requirement might
be satisfied even in the absence of a direct link "to the particular purpose of the expenditure."
Id. at 208-09 n.3 (majority opinion).
210. Cf Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending: Federalism's
Trojan Horse, 1988 SUP. CT. REv. 85, 126 ("The supposed limitations suggested by the Dole
majority do not offer much promise to limit the scope of Congress's authority."); see generally
id. at 117-23 (criticizing the Court's treatment of relatedness and non-coercion as potential
limitations on the spending power).
211. See, e.g., House Committee Hearing on Post-Boerne Legislation, supra note 7
(testimony of Thomas C. Berg); id. (testimony of Douglas Laycock); id. (testimony of Marc D.




upon the precise form of the congressional enactment, there would be a risk of
invalidation. In addition, the spending power is confined by legal and practical
limitations that might hinder its effectiveness in this context.
To achieve the same coverage as RFRA had attempted,2 2 Congress would
have to impose a funding condition that would reach state and local laws and
practices of all sorts. Thus, Congress might enact legislation stating that no
state shall receive any federal funding--or federal funding of a particular sort
or particular amount-unless the state, as a matter of its own law, forbids all
state and local governmental action that violates RFRA-like standards. Unless
states chose to forego the federal funding, they would be forced to enact state
laws mirroring the substantive language of RFRA; if all states followed suit,
this would achieve the same coverage as RFRA itself. Such a broad
congressional condition, however, would certainly test the limits of the
spending power.213 Indeed, if the relatedness limitation means anything, it
would preclude this type of condition, which would not be limited to the
purposes-however generously defined-of any particular funding program.
At the same time, depending on the amount of federal financing that was at
stake, the non-coercion limitation might be implicated.214 In theory, a state
could reject any and all federal funding, but then again, as the Court wrote in
Dole, "the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as
to pass the point at which 'pressure turns into compulsion.'
21 5
In an attempt to avoid relatedness and non-coercion issues, Congress
could adopt more narrowly confined, program-specific conditions. Congress
still might choose to cover a wide range of state and local governmental
practices. In so doing, Congress might impose its conditions one appropriation
at a time, or it might act more generally. Thus, Congress might enact general
legislation stating that any state or local government that receives federal
funding for a particular "program or activity" must comply with RFRA-like
standards in the context of that state or local program. In the past, Congress
has used just this form of legislation to induce compliance with
antidiscrimination requirements. 2
16
212. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(a) (1994) (extending RFRA's coverage to "all... State law,
and the implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before
or after [the enactment of RFRA]").
213. See House Committee Hearing on Post-Boerne Legislation, supra note 7 (testimony
of Marc D. Stem) (suggesting that this form of spending-power legislation would carry a
serious risk of judicial invalidation).
214. Cf. House Committee Hearing on Post-Boerne Legislation, supra note 7 (testimony
of Thomas C. Berg) ("Certainly, the bill could not say that any state that receives federal
assistance in any of its programs is subject to RFRA in all of them.").
215. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (quoting Steward Machine Co. v.
Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
216. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for example, includes the following
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Although this approach might stretch the relatedness limitation, it could
be successfully defended on the ground that one of Congress's purposes, in
each of its appropriations, is to protect religious practices in accordance with
RFRA-like standards. 17 To express the congressional purpose in negative,
terms, Congress would be stating that it does not want its appropriations to be
spent in ways that improperly burden the free exercise of religion."' Seen in
this light, Congress would simply be "'speciflying] in some way how the
money should be spent' 2'9 by each recipient of federal funds.220 At the same
time, this form of spending-power legislation could substantially reduce the
potentially coercive pressure for state compliance, because a state could resist
the congressional inducement in a particular program without jeopardizing
unrelated governmental functions. Thus, for example, if a state wanted to
avoid the standards of RFRA in some or all of its correctional institutions or
prisoner programs,22' it might choose to forego federal funding in those
contexts.
3. New Limits on the Spending Power?
My analysis to this point has assumed that the Supreme Court would
evaluate RFRA-like spending conditions in accordance with the basic approach
of Dole, which accords Congress generous, if not unlimited, constitutional
power. Since Dole was decided in 1987, however, the Court, in cases like
provision: "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d (1988).
217. See House Committee Hearing on Post-Boerne Legislation, supra note 7 (testimony
of Marc D. Stem) (endorsing program-specific spending conditions on the ground that the
federal government "has a legitimate interest in seeing to it that its funds are used in keeping
with [the policy of RFRA]").
218. See House Committee Hearing on Post-Boerne Legislation, supra note 7 (testimony
of Thomas C. Berg) (Congress "can ensure that federal funds will not be used to support the
imposition of burdens on religious freedom"); cf (testimony of Douglas Laycock) ("Federal aid
to one program does not empower Congress to demand compliance with RFRA in other
programs. But within a single program, [the relatedness requirement] is easily satisfied. The
federal interest is that the intended beneficiaries of federal programs not be excluded because
of their religious practice.").
219. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 216 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief for the National
Conference of State Legislatures et al. as Amicus Curiae).
220. In effect, as Professor Thomas C. Berg has put it, Congress would be "decid[ing] only
to purchase state and local services that do not burden religious freedom." House Committee
Hearing on Post-Boerne Legislation, supra note 7 (testimony of Thomas C. Berg).
221. Cf. House Committee Hearing on Post-Boerne Legislation, supra note 7 (testimony




Lopez, 222 New York,2 23 Print, 224 and Boerne221 itself, as well as in cases
interpreting the Eleventh Amendment, 26 has issued a variety of decisions that
suggest a renewed concern for constitutional federalism. 227 In light of this
trend, there is at least some chance that the Court might develop new limits on
the spending power.m An outright repudiation of Dole, however, is certainly
not likely,229 and legislation imposing program-by-program conditions, as
noted above, would probably pass constitutional muster.
Although the Supreme Court is unlikely to renounce the basic approach
of Dole, it might nonetheless identify new limits on the spending power. These
limits might come in various forms. Two are potentially relevant to the
imposition of RFRA-like conditions on a program-by-program basis.
First, the Court might invigorate the requirement of relatedness. If so, this
might affect the Court's willingness to accept a broad congressional definition
of the scope of a state or local "program or activity" that receives federal
222. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
223. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
224. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
225. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
226. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996); Idaho v. Coeur
d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 117 S. Ct. 2028 (1997). The Eleventh Amendment immunizes the
states from certain types of federal-court lawsuits. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI; 1 ROTUNDA &
NOWAK, supra note 86, § 2.12.
227. As I have noted earlier, Boerne's invalidation of RFRA was unsurprising, and it was
well-grounded in the Supreme Court's prior precedents. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying
text; see generally supra Part I (discussing Boerne's interpretation and application of Section
5). Even so, the Court refused to expand the reach of Section 5 beyond its prior precedents, and
it narrowed the scope of one of them--Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966)--by
categorically rejecting a substantive theory of congressional power. See supra notes 38-43 and
accompanying text. Standing alone, Boerne probably would not signal a significant shift in the
judicial protection of federalism. Taken together with the Court's decisions in other areas,
however, it is fair to include Boerne as part of the trend that I describe in the text.
The Supreme Court's renewed concern for constitutional federalism has given rise to a
wealth of scholarly commentary. For a recent symposium containing a collection of important
articles, along with citations and references to other relevant literature, see Symposium, New
Frontiers of Federalism, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 923 (1997).
228. Cf Baker, supra note 184, at 1914 ("a reexamination of Dole should be next on the
Lopez majority's agenda").
229. Dole is a relatively recent decision, and it was decided by the lopsided vote of seven-
to-two. Indeed, the majority opinion was written by Chief Justice Rehnquist and joined by
Justice Scalia, two of the current Court's most vigorous defenders of states' rights. See South
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
Most of the Supreme Court's recent decisions limiting the power of Congress have been
five-to-four rulings, with the five-justice majority being composed of Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Scalia, Thomas, O'Connor, and Kennedy. See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. 549; Seminole
Tribe, 116 S. Ct. 1114; Printz, 117 S. Ct. 2365. Unless Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia both were to disclaim the views they expressed in Dole, it is doubtful that there would
be five votes to overturn that decision.
1998]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
funding, and that therefore would be subject to the RFRA-like conditions.23 °
From the perspective of congressional power, an overly broad understanding
of "program or activity" tends to negate the constitutional benefits of program-
specificity. In particular, relatedness becomes a more serious issue, because the
spending condition is less closely linked to the particular state or local activities
that Congress actually is funding.2' For example, if Congress were to provide
funding to support the medical treatment of prisoners with HIV or AIDS, that
might not justify the imposition of RFRA-like standards on all of the
operations of a state prison that received this funding, much less on all of the
operations of the entire prison system of which the prison was a part.232 And
if Congress were to attempt to provide otherwise, by broadly defining
"program or activity" to encompass all of the activities of a prison or prison
system, the Supreme Court might find the congressional definition to be
constitutionally impermissible.233
A second potential development would relate to the federal enforcement
mechanisms that are available to Congress under the spending power. This
potential development requires elaboration.
In Dole, the Supreme Court approved what might be considered the
classic enforcement mechanism--that is, the federal government simply
terminating funding for states that decline to honor the federal condition. Other
Supreme Court cases, however, have approved a quite different enforcement
scheme: direct private enforcement, under federal law and in federal court, of
spending conditions that Congress has imposed on state and local recipients of
federal funds. 234  In Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 235 for
230. Compare Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984) (narrowly construing the
"program or activity" limitation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681(a) (1982)) with The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-259, 102 Stat.
28 (1988) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1988)) (responding to Grove City by dramatically
broadening the coverage of Title IX and other antidiscrimination provisions).
231. At the same time, non-coercion could also become a more serious issue. See supra
note 220 and accompanying text.
232. See generally John H. Garvey, The "Program or Activity" Rule in Antidiscrimination
Law: A Comment on S. 272, H.R. 700, and S. 431, 23 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 445 (1986)
(defending a narrow understanding of program-specificity).
233. Recognizing that the scope of operation for RFRA-like spending conditions could
affect their constitutionality under a relatedness inquiry, Professor Michael Stokes Paulsen has
suggested that Congress could perhaps avoid this problem by stating that the conditions extend
"to the maximum extent constitutionally permissible under the spending power." Senate
Committee Hearing on Post-Boerne Legislation, supra note 76 (testimony of Michael Stokes
Paulsen). As Paulsen concedes, however, this approach could create (and, in my view, probably
would create) sufficient ambiguity to render the conditions constitutionally unenforceable. See
id.; see also Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
234. See, e.g., Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60 (1992); Wilder v.
Virginia Hospital Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990); Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and
Housing Authority, 479 U.S. 418 (1987); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980); Lau v.
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example, a high school student claimed that she had been subjected to
intentional gender-based discrimination by a public school teacher, this in
violation of federal spending conditions contained in Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972.236 The Supreme Court permitted the student, as
plaintiff, to seek damages in federal court on the basis of an implied federal
right of action.237 In so doing, the Court rejected the argument that spending-
power legislation should not be construed to permit this type of remedy. 38
Franklin would appear to suggest that Congress has the constitutional
power to extract state and local consent to private enforcement, under federal
law and in federal court, of RFRA-like spending conditions. If so, then
Congress--as long as it made its intentions "unambiguously" clear239--- could
authorize aggrieved religious believers to pursue their claims in this manner,
and it could condition a state or local government's receipt of federal funding
on its submission to this form of federal jurisdiction.2 ° Yet this might be
reading the case too broadly. Franklin turned not on the question of
constitutional power, but rather on congressional intentions and on the
propriety of a damages remedy.24' Further, the Court was addressing
intentional and unjustified gender-based discrimination by a state actor,
conduct of a sort that clearly violates the Fourteenth Amendment.242 Utilizing
its remedial bower under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress
undoubtedly could have barred such discrimination as a matter of
unconditional federal regulation, and it could have expressly provided for
private enforcement under federal law and in federal court.2 43 In Franklin, the
Supreme Court observed in a footnote that Congress might have relied on
Section 5, as well as the Spending Clause, as authority for Title IX; even so, the
Court concluded-without elaboration--that a federal-law damages remedy
Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
235. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
236. See 20 U.S.C. § 168 1(a) (1988).
237. See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 76; see also Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677
(1979).
238. See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74-75.
239. See Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 363 (1992).
240. Under this sort of reasoning, it would seem that a waiver of Eleventh Amendment
immunity could also be part of the condition, as long as Congress "manifest[ed] a clear intent
to condition participation in (the relevant funding programs] on a State's consent to waive its
constitutional immunity." See Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 247 (1985).
241. Likewise, the Court's other private-enforcement cases, see supra note 234, have
focused largely on issues of statutory interpretation.
242. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996); Mississippi Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
243. See supra Part I.B.
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was available "irrespective of the constitutional source of Congress' power to
enact the statute." 2"
This language from Franklin would appear to support private, federal-law,
federal-court enforcement of RFRA-like spending conditions. But if the
constitutional issue were squarely presented today, and if the Supreme Court
were inclined to find new limits on the spending power, the Court might not
follow this language from Franklin. Instead, the Court might conclude that
private enforcement under federal law partakes of direct federal regulation, and
that the states' consent to this regulation--through the acceptance of federal
funding-is constitutionally ineffective. More specifically, the Court might
rule that the spending power, standing alone, cannot justify this type of
enforcement scheme; that is, it might rule that such enforcement is contingent
upon the presence of another, independently sufficient source of congressional
power.2 45 In Franklin, another source of power in fact was present-Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.2" In the case of RFRA-
244. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75 n.8.
245. This type of limitation on the spending power would be consistent with the notion that
spending conditions are essentially contractual in nature. Thus, as Professor David E. Engdahl
has explained, the issue of private enforcement of spending conditions can be considered an
issue of contract law-in particular, an issue of third-party enforcement. See Engdahl, supra
note 189, at 93-108. Engdahl argues that so understood, the question "is generally a question
controlled by state law," although "state law can be overridden as to spending conditions that
promote ends within the scope of an 'enumerated' power [other than the spending power]." Id.
at 96. As to funding conditions not within the scope of some other congressional power,
however, Engdahl maintains that "not even express statutory language can control the third-
party enforcement question," which must be left to state law "because constitutionally, there can
be no federal law." Id. at 97.
Engdahl's argument, as well as the possible limitation on the spending power that I
discuss in the text, relate only to the question of private enforcement as a matter of federal law.
For a superficially similar--but in fact much broader--proposed limitation on the spending
power, see Baker, supra note 184, at 1916 (proposing that "the Court presume invalid that
subset of offers of federal funds to the states which, if accepted, would regulate the states in
ways that Congress could not directly mandate under its other Article I powers").
246. Section 5 might also support the protection of individual rights under other spending-
power legislation, thereby permitting private, federal-law enforcement on that basis. Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for example, prohibits racial discrimination in federally funded
programs. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988). It would seem that the application of Title VI to state
and local governments would be within Congress's remedial power under Section 5; as a result,
private, federal-law enforcement would not be problematic under the approach that I discuss
in the text. Although perhaps more debatably, the Equal Access Act of 1984, which applies to
"public secondary school[s] which receive] Federal financial assistance," might likewise be
defended as remedial legislation under Section 5-legislation designed to enforce free speech
rights under the First Amendment. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (1988); cf Board of Educ. v.
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 235 (1990) (noting that the Equal Access Act "extended the reasoning"
of the Supreme Court's First Amendment decision in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981));
Mergens, 496 U.S. at 247 (reserving the question of whether the First Amendment, standing
alone, would have required the same result as that required by the Act); id. at 262 (Marshall,
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like conditions, by contrast, it is not at all clear that any other source of power
would be constitutionally adequate.247
Indirect support for this potential limitation on the enforcement of
spending conditions can be found in New York v. United States,2 4 which
indicated that the agreement or consent of the states is not always sufficient to
justify federal regulatory programs. In New York, the Court declared that it
would not permit the states to consent to direct federal regulation that would
otherwise exceed the constitutional power of Congress and infringe the
sovereignty of the states.249 Such consent could not be given effect, the Court
reasoned, without undermining the Constitution's concern for the political
accountability of federal and state officials alike.250 Thus, the Court invalidated
direct federal regulation as applied to the State of New York even though New
York public officials had themselves supported the enactment of the
congressional legislation, which "embodie[d] a bargain..., a compromise to
which New York was a willing participant and from which New York ha[d]
reaped much benefit., 251' Noting that "the Constitution divides authority
between federal and state governments for the protection of individuals, ' 2 2 the
Court concluded that "[w]here Congress exceeds its authority relative to the
States,... the departure from the constitutional plan cannot be ratified by the
J., concurring) (noting that to a large degree, the Act "simply codifies in statute what is already
constitutionally mandated"). If the Equal Access Act indeed can be defended on the basis of
Section 5, then private, federal-law enforcement would be justified on that basis.
Even if another source of congressional power is not present, it may be that private,
federal-law enforcement is more readily justified when a plaintiff claims that he or she is the
intendedfinancial beneficiary of a congressional spending program that is being administered
by state or local governmental officials. In Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980), for example,
the Supreme Court ruled that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) authorized AFDC recipients to pursue
a federal-law claim against the State of Maine for depriving them of benefits to which they
claimed they were entitled under spending conditions contained in the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq. (1976). See also Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990)
(approving a federal claim by health care providers challenging the adequacy of a state's
reimbursement rates under the Medicaid program); cf. Wright v. City of Roanoke
Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479 U.S. 418 (1987) (approving a federal claim by
tenants to rectify alleged overcharges by a federally funded public housing authority).
For an argument that Thiboutot and the cases following it were wrongly decided, and that
their current precedential value is dubious, see Engdahl, supra note 189, at 101-08; cf Blessing
v. Freestone, 117 S. Ct. 1353, 1364 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring) (questioning the Court's
decisions in Wilder and Wright and suggesting that "[a]llowing third-party beneficiaries of
commitments to the Federal Government to sue" may be beyond the legitimate scope of 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1988)).
247. See supra Part lI.B.
248. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
249. See id. at 180-83.
250. See id.
251. Id. at 181; see also id. at 189-200 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
252. Id. at 181.
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'consent' of state officials. 253 As a result, the Court ruled that any such
consent would be constitutionally ineffectual, because "State officials...
cannot consent to the enlargement of the powers of Congress beyond those
enumerated in the Constitution. 254
Whether the Supreme Court might develop limitations along either of the
two lines that I have suggested-invigorating the relatedness requirement or
precluding direct private enforcement under federal law-is a matter of
speculation. On the one hand, the Court might be reluctant to adopt these
limitations, particularly the second one, which would disturb the existing legal
landscape to a substantial degree. On the other hand, the Court has
demonstrated a strong desire to protect constitutional federalism, and it has
stated that the spending power should not be permitted to "render academic the
Constitution's other grants and limits of federal authority. 255 Any prediction
is hazardous, but I believe there is a distinct possibility that the Court might in
fact adopt either or both of the limitations that I have discussed, especially in
the context of legislation that the Court might regard as a congressional attempt
to circumvent its decision in Boerne.256 As a result, the most cautious form of
spending-power legislation would adopt a relatively narrow definition of
"program or activity," and it would not authorize private enforcement of the
RFRA-like conditions as a matter of federal law.
253. Id. at 182. See id. ('The constitutional authority of Congress cannot be expanded by
the 'consent' of the governmental unit whose domain is thereby narrowed, whether that unit is
the Executive Branch or the States.").
254. New York, 505 U.S. at 182; cf. id. at 183 ("Where state officials purport to submit to
the direction of Congress in this manner, federalism is hardly being advanced.").
The Supreme Court might extend this reasoning to a state's consent to federal regulation
in the form of private enforcement of spending conditions, but then again, it might not. Among
other possible distinctions, there is a notable difference in the duration of the state's consent.
In particular, the state's consent in New York, had it been effective, would have been permanent
or indefinite in duration--4hat is, it would have extended for the life of the federal legislation,
regardless of the state's own change of heart. By contrast, a state can terminate its consent to
spending conditions simply by refusing to accept additional federal funding. For future funding
periods, the state would not be subject to the conditions at all, and therefore would not be
subject to any enforcement schemes that the state might otherwise find objectionable.
255. Id. at 167.
256. Cf Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. [The Child-Labor Tax Case], 259 U.S. 20 (1922)
(invalidating congressional legislation, grounded on the taxing power, that had been enacted
in response to Hammer v. Dagenhart [The Child Labor Case], 247 U.S. 251 (1918), which had
previously invalidated very similar legislation grounded on the Commerce Clause).
In his contribution to this symposium, Professor Thomas C. Berg provides additional
commentary and a different perspective on the two potential limitations that I have identified,
suggesting that, in his view, the Court would be unlikely to adopt either of them. See Berg,
supra note 76, at Part III.B.
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4. Conventional Spending-Power Enforcement Mechanisms and their
Potential Effectiveness
Rather than attempt to authorize private enforcement as a matter of federal
law, Congress might adopt other, more conventional enforcement provisions.
As the Supreme Court has observed, "the typical remedy for state
noncompliance with federally imposed conditions is not a private cause of
action for noncompliance but rather action by the Federal Government to
terminate funds to the State." '257 Thus, Congress could indirectly enforce a
state's RFRA-like obligations by authorizing federal agencies to determine if
a state was in violation, and, if so, to cut off federal funding for the
noncompliant program."' Depending upon the terms of the congressional
legislation, moreover, this indirect enforcement of a state's RFRA-like
obligations could be at the behest of aggrieved religious believers, in the
context of particular disputes. 259  More generally, this indirect federal
enforcement might be quite effective-although this would depend, of course,
on the resources, vigilance, and efficiency of the federal agencies involved.
Enforcement might also be influenced by political considerations; in particular,
it might be politically difficult for agencies to in fact withhold funding under
popular federal programs.260
State-law enforcement would be another possibility, and here the
Constitution certainly would not preclude direct enforcement in favor of
aggrieved religious believers. Although acting under federal encouragement,
states assuming RFRA-like obligations would be doing so as a matter of state
policy, and their obligations therefore might be enforceable as a matter of state
257. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28 (1981).
258. Statutory models for this method of enforcement are readily available. See, e.g., 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000d-1 to 2000d-2 (1988) (Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); 20 U.S.C. §§
1682-1683 (1988) (Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972).
259. Cf Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947)
(upholding a federal enforcement scheme through which the United States Civil Service
Commission had directed a state government to suspend a particular employee who had not
complied with the federal policy embodied in a spending condition, or, in lieu thereof, to face
a withholding of federal funds).
260. To mitigate the potential problem of nonenforcement by federal agencies, Congress
could authorize private suits in federal court, not against state or local governments or their
officials, but against the federal agencies themselves. Thus, aggrieved individuals could be
authorized to obtain federal-court injunctive relief against recalcitrant federal agencies,
requiring them to honor their statutory obligations by investigating alleged violations of the
RFRA-like conditions and by cutting off funding to state and local programs that are found to
be noncompliant.
Even in the absence of specific congressional authorization, this form of injunctive relief
might be available under current law, at least in extreme situations. See Adams v. Richardson,
480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc).
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law.261 Thus, aggrieved religious believers could perhaps pursue their claims
in state tribunals, whether administrative or judicial. Some state tribunals
might be sympathetic to these claims, but others might not. After all, a state
might have agreed to the spending condition only reluctantly, and-whatever
the United States Supreme Court might think--the state might regard the
condition as an improper intrusion on the state's prerogatives. As a result, a
state tribunal might interpret the state's RFRA-like obligations narrowly,
thereby frustrating the purpose of Congress. 262 At the same time, however,
stingy interpretations of a state's obligations could trigger federal-agency
scrutiny, and potentially the loss of federal funding.
Although not free from constitutional scrutiny, the spending power
provides Congress with a firm constitutional foundation for a statutory
response to Boerne,2' a response that could induce the states to protect
religious conduct even from laws of general application. To be sure, the
spending power is not a perfect source of authority for the congressional
imposition of RFRA-like standards. Precisely because the congressional
legislation would impose those standards only through indirect means, its scope
and effectiveness might be limited. As I have explained, Congress--to avoid
the risk of constitutional invalidation-would be well-advised to impose the
standards only on a cautiously defined, program-by-program basis. Not all
state and local programs receive federal funding, however, and some states
might specifically refuse federal funding in particular contexts in order to avoid
the assumption of RFRA-like duties.26" Even so, many state and local
programs do receive federal funding, and it is likely that most of them would
accept the RFRA-like duties in order to retain the funding that they receive.
Enforcement would still be a question. The most effective type of enforcement
probably would be private enforcement under federal law, but there is at least
some risk that the Supreme Court might find that method of enforcement to be
261. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
262. It also is possible that some state courts, relying upon anti-establishment provisions
in their own constitutions, might find that their states are constitutionally forbidden from
honoring RFRA-like conditions, or, perhaps, that they are forbidden to do so in at least some
circumstances. If so, these states would face the loss of federal funding, but Congress's RFRA-
like objective would remain unfulfilled, at least in the absence of state constitutional
amendments. See generally Van Aistyne, supra note 189 (arguing that state and local
governments cannot accept federal funds if those funds come with conditions that would violate
state constitutional law).
263. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
264. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
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constitutionally impermissible. The RFRA-like obligations could be enforced
indirectly by federal funding authorities, however, and more direct, private
enforcement might be possible as a matter of state law.265
III. CONCLUSION
In response to City of Boerne v. Flores,26 Congress may wish to enact
new legislation that is designed, as was RFRA, to protect religious conduct
from state and local governmental infringement. If so, it is important that the
new legislation be able to survive judicial review; the cause of religious
freedom certainly would not be served by the enactment of another statute that
the Supreme Court would find unconstitutional.267  Any legislation that
Congress adopts therefore should be grounded on a solid constitutional
foundation, and it should be crafted in a manner that limits the risk of judicial
nullification. 26' This is not the time for Congress to push the limits of its
constitutional power, especially when Congress, without pushing those limits,
can respond to Boerne in a productive way--even if not as fully or as
categorically as Congress might prefer.2 69
265. As I suggest in the text, the most cautious form of spending-power legislation would
adopt a relatively narrow definition of "program or activity," and it would not authorize private
enforcement of the RFRA-like conditions as a matter of federal law. Statutory limitations of
this sort, however, could reduce the scope and effectiveness of the congressional legislation,
and, as a result, Congress might be reluctant to approve them.
If Congress were to adopt a less cautious form of legislation, one that included a broad
definition of "program or activity" or one that authorized private, federal-law enforcement, it
would certainly be prudent to include "severability" or "fall-back" provisions in the
legislation-provisions designed to take effect in the event that any portion of the legislation
were declared unconstitutional. Indeed, a severability provision might be advisable for any
legislation that Congress might adopt in response to Boerne, whether under the spending power
or otherwise.
266. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
267. As Marc D. Stem observed in congressional testimony in the aftermath of Boerne, "A
rush to legislate with legislation that has not been thoroughly considered is no boon to religious
liberty. Nor is it helpful," Stem continued, "to pass legislation which will inevitably be struck
down by the Supreme Court in the name of federalism or separation of powers." House
Committee Hearing on Post-Boerne Legislation, supra note 7 (testimony of Marc D. Stem).
268. As Professor Ira C. Lupu has noted, the congressional consideration and adoption of
RFRA were plagued by inadequate constitutional planning and by insufficient constitutional
debate and deliberation. See Ira C. Lupu, The Failure of RFRA, 20 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L.J.
575, pt. I (1998). There is reason to believe that Congress may do better in its consideration
of post-Boerne legislation. Indeed, there already have been committee hearings exploring---in
some detail-the sources, nature, and limits of Congress's power to protect religious freedom
from state and local infringement. See supra note 76.
269. For a dramatically contrary view, see House Committee Hearing on Post-Boerne
Legislation, supra note 7 (testimony of Charles W. Colson) (arguing that the Supreme Court
"is engaged in a high-stakes war with Congress"; that "Congress cannot duck this fight"; and
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Due to the likelihood of invalidation, Congress should not enact
legislation that does little more than reenact the terms of RFRA itself; in
particular, Congress should not enact legislation that attempts to directly
protect religious conduct, under a "compelling interest" standard, from state
and local laws and practices of all sorts, no matter how general and
nondiscriminatory those laws and practices might be. Boerne makes clear, of
course, that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment does not authorize such
legislation.27° Neither, it appears, does the Commerce Clause.2 7' Congress's
power to implement treaties presents a somewhat closer question, but anything
approaching a verbatim reenactment of RFRA would severely test the limits of
this congressional power, and such a statute probably would be invalidated.272
If Congress wishes to directly regulate state and local governmental action
without creating a serious risk of invalidation, the congressional legislation
would have to be more limited than RFRA. Assuming it could be supported
by an adequate legislative record, for example, Section 5 probably would
permit Congress to make unlawful, or presumptively unlawful, laws or
governmental practices that have a substantially discriminatory effect on
religion in situations suggesting a serious risk or likelihood of discriminatory
purpose.273 Congress's power to implement treaties, moreover, probably would
permit Congress to provide at least limited protection for religious
conduct--protection along the lines described in Article 18 of the
CCPR-even from laws and practices that are entirely nondiscriminatory in
27nature.   Section 5 legislation, however, would not advance the basic
objective of RFRA, which was to protect religious conduct from
nondiscriminatory governmental action. Legislation implementing the CCPR
would advance that objective to some degree, but it would extend an
international obligation into the domestic-law realm of state and local
governments; for political and prudential reasons, Congress is unlikely to take
this step.27
5
The most promising statutory response to Boerne would not directly
regulate the states, but instead would work indirectly. Thus, under the
that, in responding to Boerne, Congress "must be as bold as the Court has been"). For a
suggestion that Congress should not "push the envelope" as of yet, but that "further and more
aggressive corrective measures" might be appropriate if the Supreme Court invalidates new
congressional legislation, see Senate Committee Hearing on Post-Boerne Legislation, supra
note 76 (testimony of Michael Stokes Paulsen).
270. See supra Part I.
271. See supra Part II.B. 1.
272. See supra Part lI.B.2.
273. See supra Part II.A.
274. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 175-177 and accompanying text.
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Spending Clause, Congress could impose spending conditions to induce the
states to protect religious conduct even from generally applicable laws and
practices. If carefully crafted, such legislation would be very likely to
withstand judicial review. Even here, however, Congress should resist the
temptation to extend the limits of its power. Overly broad legislation, or
legislation that seemed but a subterfuge for direct regulation, would trigger
serious judicial scrutiny and the risk of invalidation. As a result, any spending-
power legislation should be program-specific, and it probably should not
attempt to authorize private enforcement as a matter of federal law.276
One could argue that Congress should do nothing in response to
Boerne;277 that it should simply accept, at least for now, the judgment of the
Supreme Court-not only in Boerne, but also in Employment Division v.
Smith.278 Even prior to its invalidation in Boerne, RFRA may not have been
particularly effective, 279 and it is not obvious that new legislation will be any
more successful. Congressional inaction, moreover, would not make Smith and
Boerne the last word on religious freedom at the state and local level. States
remain free (subject to the Establishment Clause) to protect religious freedom
to a greater degree than federal law requires, and some states, as a matter of
legislation or state constitutional law, will provide such additional protection.80
Likewise, the Supreme Court itself may eventually adopt a more generous
interpretation of the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause.28' At this stage,
276. See supra Part II.C.
277. See Lupu, supra note 268, at pts. III-IV (arguing that religious freedom resists
codification, and that the courts should be left free to address and develop the constitutional
contours of this freedom through the continuing process of case-by-case, judicial
decisionmaking).
278. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
279. For a well-documented argument that RFRA's accomplishments were limited, see
Lupu, supra note 268, at Part II. But cf House Committee Hearing on Post-Boerne Legislation,
supra note 7 (testimony of Mark E. Chopko) (claiming that "in fact, under the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, religion did far better than many of us thought it would," in part
because "RFRA served as an important tool in negotiation, bargaining, and reaching
compromise").
280. See House Committee Hearing on Post-Boerne Legislation, supra note 7 (testimony
of Jeffrey Sutton) (describing post-Boerne efforts to develop state-law, statutory counterparts
to RFRA); id. (testimony of Rev. Oliver Thomas) (describing state court decisions interpreting
state constitutional law to provide greater protection than that required by federal law); see also
Angela C. Carmella, State Constitutional Protection of Religious Exercise: An Emerging Post-
Smith Jurisprudence, 1993 BYU L. REv. 275.
281. Compare House Committee Hearing on Post-Boerne Legislation, supra note 7
(testimony of Rev. Oliver Thomas) (suggesting that the Supreme Court might discard the
approach of Smith in as little as three to five years), with id. (testimony of Thomas C. Berg)
(noting that Boerne solidifies the precedent of Smith, making it "less likely than ever" that the
Court will soon overturn it); id. (testimony of Mark E. Chopko) ("[T]here may not be sufficient
votes on the Court to revisit Smith anytime soon").
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the law might profit from new thinking--theoretical, doctrinal, and
practical--on the issue of religion-based exemptions from general laws; new
congressional legislation, by contrast, could have the effect of entrenching old
approaches and discouraging the investigation and development of new ones.
Yet congressional inaction, in my view, would not be the best response
to Boerne. Congress has a role to play in the struggle to protect religious
freedom. Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere, Congress has a role to play in
determining the meaning of the Constitution itself, including the extent to
which it should be read to protect religious freedom from state and local
infringement. 8 2 Under our system of government, Congress cannot and should
not ignore the roles and functions of other constitutional actors, notably the
Supreme Court and the states. That was the mistake of RFRA, and Congress
ought not repeat it. But Congress properly can attempt to influence those other
actors in a manner that not only respects the limits of congressional power, but
that also appreciates the Supreme Court's constitutional role, as well as the
contributions that the states might make in defining the scope of religious
freedom. The spending power may be ideally suited to this purpose.
Under the spending power, Congress probably has the constitutional
authority to impose program-by-program conditions tracking the substantive
language of RFRA. Such legislation would give the states at least a degree of
choice, and it would not intrude on their sovereignty in the manner of direct
regulation. Unlike RFRA itself, moreover, such legislation would challenge
the Supreme Court only by indirection. Congress would once again be stating
its disagreement with Smith, but it would not be directly rebuking the Supreme
Court or repudiating altogether the Court's understanding of the proper
relationship between religious freedom and constitutional federalism.
Although it would proceed by indirection and might be hampered by
enforcement difficulties, this form of legislation could induce the states to give
RFRA-like protection to religious believers. It might also prompt the Supreme
Court to reconsider its own position, as expressed in Smith.
Although this form of legislation probably would be constitutional, and
although it might well advance the cause of religious freedom, Congress also
has other spending-power options. For example, it might refrain from
extending its spending conditions to all state and local programs that receive
federal funding; instead, it might choose to respect the rights of states to make
their own decisions in certain contexts, such as prisons, in a manner entirely
free from federal inducement." 3 In framing its spending conditions, moreover,
282. See Conkle, supra note 8, at 79-90.
283. Cf Lupu, supra note 268, at pt. III (arguing that any post-Boerne legislation should
at least make prison cases "subject to an explicitly different standard than non-prison cases, so
that the results in the latter are not dragged down by the interpretations in the former").
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Congress might choose not to follow the language of RFRA, complete with its
"compelling interest" formula. It might devise other, more flexible, standards
for the recognition of religion-based exemptions, permitting the states, within
the bounds of these standards, to develop their own concrete formulations.
284
Indeed, Congress could simply require the states themselves, with respect to
every program receiving federal funds, to seriously consider--perhaps under
specified procedures-the issue of religion-based exemptions, and to formally
adopt their own policies.8 5 A state could deliberate within the context of each
program, or it could consider the issue as a matter of general legislative policy,
with the resulting legislation being as general or as program-specific as the
state might choose it to be.
These sorts of congressional choices, of course, might limit the scope or
force of Congress's substantive policymaking, but they would also express a
certain respect for the states, as well as a certain degree of congressional
humility. The problem of religion-based exemptions is difficult, complex, and
controversial; 286 Congress may not have the only acceptable answer, or even
284. For example, the spending condition might provide that any request for a religion-
based exemption must be granted unless there is "good and sufficient cause" for denying the
request, with the states themselves being left to determine the meaning of "good and sufficient
cause."
285. In FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982), the Supreme Court rejected a state-
sovereignty attack on federal legislation, grounded on the Commerce Clause, that had directly
required state utility regulatory commissions to "consider" certain federal standards and, in so
doing, to follow specified procedural requirements. See id. at 746-50, 761-71. It is an open
question whether FERC survives New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), and Printz
v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997). Cf New York, 505 U.S. at 161-62 (attempting to
distinguish FERC); Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2380, 2381 & n.14 (same). But even if FERC is no
longer controlling with respect to direct federal mandates, there is little doubt that Congress,
acting under the Spending Clause, can impose a "consideration" requirement as a condition to
the receipt of federal funding.
286. The rule of Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), has been condemned
not only by Congress, but also by numerous constitutional scholars. See, e.g., Laycock, supra
note 96; Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHi.
L. REv. 1109 (1990); Stephen Pepper, Conflicting Paradigms of Religious Freedom: Liberty
Versus Equality, 1993 BYU L. REV. 7; Harry F. Tepker, Jr., Hallucinations of Neutrality in the
Oregon Peyote Case, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1 (1991). But there is contrary scholarly opinion
as well, supporting the basic approach of Smith, if not the Court's rationale. See, e.g., William
P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. Cm-. L. REv. 308 (199 1).
Even from a religious standpoint, it is not always clear that religion-based exemptions
are an unmitigated good. See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, The Constitutional Rhetoric of Religion,
20 U. ARK. LITME ROCK L.J. 619, pt. II (1998) (arguing that a generalized, RFRA-like regime
of religion-based exemptions paints religion as a weak force, in need of special judicial
protection, and that such a regime might thereby contribute to the marginalization of religion
in American society); Robin W. Lovin, Religious Freedom, 1997: Churches and Consensus
Building, CHRSTIAN CENTURY, Aug. 13-20, 1997, at 716, 717 (suggesting that the assertion
of claims for religion-based exemptions, in certain contexts, can tend to reduce religious claims
about the human good to the status of group preferences); Mark Tushnet, The Rhetoric of Free
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the best one. In the contemporary United States, moreover, failures to protect
religious freedom are more a result of inattention than hostility.287 As a result,
inducing the states to specifically address this problem could move the law in
a very healthy direction.288 And if the states did not respond in a suitable
fashion, of course, there would always be room for additional congressional
legislation.
Used in a cautious but creative way, the spending power would permit
Congress to encourage the states not only to protect religious conduct from
general laws, but also to define and implement that protection in new and
potentially productive ways. At the same time, Congress could signal its
continuing dissatisfaction with the legal regime of Smith, thereby prodding the
Supreme Court to reconsider that decision. This course of action might not
achieve all of its intended results, but it would push the law in the right
direction. And, at least for now, that may be all that Congress can or should
attempt to do.
Exercise Discourse, 1993 BYU L. REv. 117, 136, 138 (arguing that "pre-Smith law put religious
believers in the position of supplicants" and that it "instituted a form of idolatry in its
acquiescence to the judiciary as an institution that can authoritatively determine when religious
conscience ought, in the worldly domain, yield to government demand").
For a discussion and critique of various possible justifications for religion-based
exemptions, see Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: Regrettable Justifications for
Religious Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L.J. 555, pts. 1I-III (1998).
287. As Mark E. Chopko has observed, "burdens can be created for religious practitioners
and on religious practices in myriad unintended ways." House Committee Hearing on Post-
Boerne Legislation, supra note 7 (testimony of Mark E. Chopko). And refusals to
accommodate the burdened religious believers, Chopko explains, are often a product not of
hostility, but of misunderstanding-of a failure to appreciate the adverse impact of the laws or
regulations in question. See id.
288. This notion of state-by-state decisionmaking, of course, would not be attractive to
those who dislike the prospect, even in the short-term, of a diversity of solutions to the issue
of religion-based exemptions. Cf House Committee Hearing on Post-Boerne Legislation,
supra note 7 (testimony of Mark E. Chopko) (expressing concern about a "hodgepodge" of
state-law approaches that would create "uneven protection for religion across the country").
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